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Summary findings
Did the World Bank's policy-based lending to Kenya in  were in fact not always implemented. In principle, for
the 1980s allow Kenya to undertake adjustment, or to  example, an auction market for government paper was
postpone it? The answer is mixed, says Swamy. Success  created, but in practice financial institutions typically
was greatest in trade liberalization (Lnd exchange rate  took up most of that paper 'by  arrangement.'  And
depreciation), and to a lesser extent in export  restrictions on movements of maize were removed but
develop  ment - and these reforms would probauly not  reimposed.
have occurred without steady Bank lending. But one  Moreover, the design of the structural adjuitment
could argue that budget support through funds from the  loans appears, in retrospect, to have been faulty. Too
International Development Association may have helped  many conditions - too general, and based on dated
Kenya postpone critical public sector reform - in the  sectoral information - were attached to each loan, in
civil service and social sectors and in divestiture of  part because of political considerations. And the Bank
parastatals (including the National Cereals and Produce  released credit tranches when conditions were met in
Board).  letter but not in spirit.
Was aid to Kenya (including the Bank's) overgenerous?  The adjustment program benefited in the second half
Swamy concludes that, based on reform behavior and  of the 1980s from lessons learned in the first half of the
performance, Kenya may deserve aid less than Ghana  decade, particularly concerning trade liberalization and
(Africa's best performer) but it does not exhibit the same  export development. But the design and dimensions of
aid dependency as other donor  favorites in the region.  reform in the agricultural sector were too limited to
But its public investment program did a poor job in  achieve significant restructuring of the sector, and
ranking priorities, and growing reliance on grants and  political interests effectively sabotaged the program. The
counterpart  funds undoubtedly contributed to more  second attempt at adjustment was also undermined  by
consLmption spending by government, particularly on  increasing financial laxity. The experience in Kenya
the civil service and parastatals.  underlines the difficulty of implementing structural
Implementation of structural ad,ustment in Kenya was  adjustment under either financial laxity or extreme
often lethargic and sometimes even contra:.y to stated  financial stringency.
policies, says Swamy. And despite a fairly stable political  Note, too, that many things have changed in Kenya
climate, commitment to the adjustment program was  since this study was completed in the early 1990s.
patchy and intermittent.  Reforms ostensibly undertaken
This paper - a product of the Chief Economist's Office, Africa Regional Office - is part of a larger effort in the region
to study the process and impact of structural adjustment. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 181
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Vanessa Saldanha, room J1O-206, extension 35742  (75 pages
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Introduction  2nd Overview
Kenya started the decade of the eighties  with many economic  features that
were remarkably more favorable  than those in other Sub-Saharan  countries. The
structure and dynamism  of the economy  in the late 1970s reflected  the favorable
policy environment  of the past. But economic  management  deteriorated  in the late
1970s  which witnessed,  inter alia the intensification  or emergence of a number of
major distortions.  During the 1980s  progress was measurable  and significant  only in
a few areas and the economy's momentum  of the first two decades of Independence
slowed considerably. As one commentator  writes, "Few country lending experiences
have given the Bank so much cause for frustration"  (Mosley and others, 1991).
Whatever  the merit of that  judgement, there were, no doubt some frustrations
stemming  from three sources.
First, the stated policies-which were broadly in line with the Bank's
recommendations-were undermined  by implementation  which was often lethargic  and
sometimes  even completely  contrary to the stated policies. Thus, the fourth plan
document (1979) enunciated  a more open strategy for the industrial sector. In 1982,
the Kenya Government  Commission  on Government  Expenditures  clearly indicated
th.at  greater discipline  and efficiency  were necessary,  and that the gross misuse of
governmet  resources should b. curbed. The Sessional  Paper of 1986 contained  policy
Istatements  on reforming agricultural  iAiarketing,  reducing  protection  to industry, and
controlling  public spending. But the first adjustment  attempt (1980-84)  was marked
by a virtually total lack of compliance,  partly because of design and timing problems
but also because the commitment  to the stated policy  changes was limited to a small
coterie of top civil servants. Trade reforms were not carried out, and grain marketing
was not liberalized. Even in the second  period of adjustment  (1985-91), when much
more effort went into building  a broader consensus, the pace was "incremental," and
the c .mmitment of top officials  waxed and waned. Overall, despite a fairly stable
political climate, commitment  was patchy and intermittent  throi!ghout.
Second,  the lack of transparency  in the implementation  of reforms often
dampened  or nullified the structural reforms that were undertaken.  Although  almost
all imports were in principle liberalized,  i.e.  "automatically  licensed," supervisory
reports indicate that in practice there was, infact, lack of automaticity  and
transparency  reflected  in undue influences  that restricted imports  that competed  with
domestic  production. Although  an auction market for government  pa4.-r  was created,
financial  institutions  typical!y  took up most of that paper by "arrangement." And
although  the banking laws and the supervision  anparatus  were strengthened,  political
considerations  prevented effective  prudential  oversight  leading to a banking  crisis.
Similarly,  the process of budget rationalization  was often bypassed, and controls on
movement  of grail: reinstituted  after a period of relaxation.
Third, during the first phase of adjustment,  the design of the structural
adjustment  loans in the early 1980s, and the first agricultural  sector adjustment  loan in
1986 were faulty, at least in retrospect. P fairly rapid pace of trade liberalization  was
2postulated  when the country was attempting  to control one of its worst financial  crisis.
In addi on, the design of the grain marketing  conditionality  contained  a basic
flaw-market  liberalization  was seen to occur simultaneously  with increases  in official
procurement  prices. Each loan was fettered with too many conditions,  which were too
general, focusing  on studies  and action plans partly because there was inadequate
sector understanding  (sectoral  work on industry  and trade was dated) and partly
because of political  consideratijns. The Bank also released  credit tranches when
conditionalities  were met more in letter but not in spirit.
The adjustment  program in the second half of the 1980s  benefitted from
greater experience and preparation at least in some areas. Instead  of grouping many
reforms in one operation, the adjustment  agenda was parceled into sectoral  programs.
The design of the reform programs in trade liberalization  and export development  was
better based on updated information.  In recognition  that trade liberalization  was not
going to be completed  within the time frame of a single credit, progress was
monitored  under the export development  credit which followed. And mov.,s  on the
exchange  rate were monitored  through  IMF programs. The relative success cf the
trade liberalization  program is attributable  to these factors of better design and to
intens: .z supervision.
The lessons  of the early 1980s were not, however, fully internalized  in the
policy dialogue  on agricultural  sector reform, which remained  an area of frustratingly
slow progress.  There was even some reversal, with the recent reinstitution  of grain
movement  controls. The conditionality  on reducing  the role of the grain-marketing
parastatal  remained  vague. In the second  structural adjustment  loan (1982), the
3condition was to "undertake  a review  oi maize marketing  and implement  its
recommendations." In the agricultural  sector adjustment  loan (1986), the National
Cereals and Produce  Board (NCPB)  was one of the three parastatals  to be
"restructured,"  including  a write-off of debt to reduce its claims on the budget.
Because  this restructuring  never happened,  the second agricultural  sector adjustment
loan (1990)  asked for "performance  contracts" to raise the National  Cereals and
Produce Board's efficiency. And conditions  continued to be impos6d  for studies,
plans, and exchanges  of views. The second agricultural  sector adjustment  loan had the
following  as second tranche condituons:  the finalization  of studies on increasing  the
efficiency  of private fertilizer  imports and on minimizing  the distortions  from
aid-financed fertilizers, the completion  of a food security plan (started under the iirst
loan), and the preparation of a drought contingency  plan. Perhaps, the Bank  bought
into a far too gradual pace of reform knowing  that the government  lacked conviction
and political  will. The design and dimensions  of reforms in this area were too limited
to achieve significant  restructuring  of the sector and political  interests effectively
sabotaged  the program.
Another major flaw was that the second attempt at adjustment  was made in the
face of growing financial  undiscipline. Fund programs were not adhered to; the fiscal
balance  deteriorated steadily  and inflation  accelerated. This had a different  effect on
adjustment  than in the earlier period when reforms became hostage  to a stringent
stabilization  program.  Fiscal undiscipline  in the later half of the eighties made trade
and financial  sector reform difficult in a different way:  rather than fiscal policy
defending  a certain exchange  rate, the exchange  rate was forced to continuously  catch
4up with higher inflation. Independent  monetary  policy and the move toward indirect
instruments  of monetary  control were made far more problematic  because of the large
financing  requirements  of the Government. In retrospect,  this experience  underlines
the difficulties  of implementing  structural  reforms in the context of either financial
laxity or extreme stringency. A relatively  stable environment  seems essential.  Such
an environment  was not present during much of the eighties.
Indeed, the lack of sufficient  attention  to the control of financial  balances
threatened  to undercut  the Bank's lending program altogether. In the late eighties,
some second-tranche  releases of sector credits were made, even though medium-term
macroeconomie  stability  was clearly in question. But the Bank soon found itself i.
the position of being unable to justify such releases. At the consultative  meeting  of
November 1991, donors also expressed  concem with the lack of transparency  and
accountability  in the use of public  funds.  In September  1992, the Bank decided to
postpone  disbursements  of the second tranches  of ongoing  operations because several
sector-specific  conditions  had not been met and most importantly,  the macroeconomic
program was completely  off-track. In December 1992, it cancelled  the second
tranche of the second agricultural  sector operation  because of the reimposition  of
grain-movement  controls.
In the first few months of 1993, the Kenyan  government  completed  many of
the structural reforms required under the sectoral  loans, (with the important  exception
of removing  grain-movement  controls). But it was unable to maintain  a satisfactory
macroeconomic  framework despite  a "shadow-program"  agreed with the IMF.
Although  growth in government  expenditures  and credit to the government  slowed
5temporarily,  this was offset by a rapid increase  in money  supply because the central
bank allowed many delinquent  and distressed financial  institutions  to borrow heavily
from it.  It was not until April 1993 that a satisfactory  agreement  to control the deficit
and the financial  intermediaries  was reached  and the Bank  could contemplate  releasing
the second tranches.  By this time, the foreign exchange  situation  had become  so
strained that the government  had reversed some of its earlier reforms.  It is yet to be
seen whether thb government  will imp!ement  the measures  necessary  to restore and
maintain  financial  stability. But it is clear that the Bank and the country paid a price
in terms of continuity  of reform and country  dialogue.
The Economy  before adjustment
Good performance  indicators
At the outset of the 1980s, Kenya had a distinctly  more favorable  economic
structure, incentives,  and institutions  than did most other countries  in Africa. In the
neariy two decades since Kerya's Independence  in 1963, both its political  leadership
and development  strategy showed  remarkable  continuitvy.  The strategy was based
soundly on agricultural  development,  particularly  of smallholder  agriculture. It helped
the GDP grow by 6.6 percent annually in the first decade after Independence,  with
agriculture growing at nearly 5 percent annually. Although  the oil price shocks
slowed growth in the 1970s to about 4 percent annually, GDP growth was still above
the average for low-income countries. Savings  and investment  in Kenya were
6relatively high for its per capita income levels; both had approximated  20 percent of
GDP during the 1970s. The incremental  capital  output ratio, while having risen from
3 in the 1960s  to 4 between 1972 and 1977, was not unreasonable,  particularly  given
the oil price shcwk  in the early 1970s. The tax revenue ratio had increased from about
12 percent in 1966-67 to 21 percent in 1979-80, and the current fiscal account had
produced  a surplus of 2.5 to 4 percent of GDP annually for the investment  program.
Public and private investment  in human  capital formation  yielded educational  and
health indicators well above the X  crage for Sub-Saharan  Africa. Pnmary school
enrollment  was not far from being universal.  A life expectancy  of 55 years and an
infant mortalUty  rate of 83 per 1,000 live births were in 1980 significantly  more
favorable than the average for Sub-Saharan  Africa.
The structure of production  also changed significantly  after Independence.  The
government  had distributed  to smaller farmers' a considerable  amount of
high-potential  and medium-potential  land that had belonged to large farmers, and had
encouraged smail farmers  to cultivate  tea, coffee, and hybrid maize, and to take up
dairy farming. The smallholders'  share of coffee  and tea production had increased
from practically  nothing in 1955 to 40 and 70 percent respectively  in the early 1980s.
Between 1965 and 1979, the small-scale  farm area under improved  varieties of maize
increased  about forty fold. The impetus for smallholder  activities helped  rural income
grow by 5.2 percent annually  from 1974 to 1982, much of it in nonfarm activities.
Growth of income was probably  just as strong in the earlier years.  Collier and Lall
(1984) estimated  that, in the Central Province, rural income per adult equivalent
increased  at 3.8% p.a. during 1963-74  and Crawford and Thorbeck (1984)  estimated
7that the incidence  of povertv was reduced from 50% of small-holder  population  to
22%.
Although  a dualistic  farming sector continued to exist (about 3,500 large farms
accounted for 39 percent of cultivable  area in 1979) as influential  Africans bought
large farms, ranchles,  and estates from departing Europeans. small farmers were not
neg'ccted or taxed. Because the large farmer lobby was ifluertial, prices paid for
major export croks, maize, and wheat were near M  )rld prices and crop development
support was extensive.  Smaller farmers  benefitted  from both. Moreover, traditional
export crops were not taxed explicitly  2,  and a diversified  tax structure supported  a
sustained  and high tax effort. Al! in all, in this largest sector of the economy-the
livelihood  oI dhe  majonty of Kenyans-there had bee~n  remarkable  transformation  and
growth. In this, Kenya was unlike most countries in the region.
The economy was also beginning  to see favorable  demographic  trends.
Buoyed  by favorable income growth in rural areas, and improved health conditions,
the rate of population  growth initially  increased from 3.0 percent annualiy  at
Independence  to 3.8 percent by the end of the 1970s, and the fertility rate increased
from 6.8 to 7.9 percent. However, during 19o0s unfolded, fertility began to decline,
falling to 7.7 by 1984  and 6.7 by 1989. Because  the government  did not ofte-
extensive family planning  services until the mid eighties, -he  demographic  transition
should  be attributed  to other factors, such as the increase  in education  of females, the
rising private costs of education,  and the moderr'izatio,n  of Kenyan society  and
economic  gr,  ,h that took place in the 1960s  and 1970s. Of course, given the
dynamics  of population  growth, the full effects of a fertility  decline will not be felt
8for many decadt.  The government  must in the meantime  address the pressures
imposed  by the growth of population  on arable land, social services, and productive
ernployment.  Nevertheless,  Kenya is one of the few countries in Africa in which the
demographic  transition  had started in the ealy  1980s.
Less favorable performance  indicators
Performance  in other areas of the Ke  'an economy  was less buoyant, and the
economic  structure had become  badly distorted. An uneasy yet mutually
accommodating  relationship  betweer.  Asian-Kenyan  entrepreneurs  and
African-Kenyans  in political  power had created a highly protected, uncompetit  ve,
and oligopolistic  industrial structure. The structure  served the economy  well shortly
after Independence,  and, fueled by the rise in rural income and by regional trading
arrangements,  industry grew at a rate of nearly 10 percent annually between 1964 and
1978. But the custom  union with Tanzania  and Uganda  began to collapse  in the
mid-to late 1970s  and as the sector became more insular, industrial  growth
decelerated  in the 1980s. BY 1985, the share of imports in domestic supply had fallen
from its 1972 level of 44 percent to 19 percent, accompanied  by a decline in the share
of exports in gross output. Import substitution  came to account  for two thirds of
growth in the expanding  subsectors,  while several  industries  actually contracted.
Gross investment  in manufacturing  fell heavily, declining  in real terms to less than
half of its 1978 level by 1985-suggestiuig  in fact disinvestment.  The limits to import
substitution,  the collapse  of the regional trading arrangements,  and the surge of
9vandalism  against Asian-Kenyans  in the wake of the attempted  coup in 1982-all
hastened  the decline in investment.  And inside the sector, the growing pervasiveness
of the import licensing  system and regulations  on business  activities  in Kenya created
enormous  opportunities  for rent-seeking and for executive  discretion.
By the early 1980s, the public sector had become  overextended.  The
"Kenyanization"  of industry  and the desire to industrialize  rapidly had led to the
creation of massive  public sector ownership, not only in such traditional  activities  as
utilities and transport,  but also in distribution  and manufacturing. Traditional
suspicion  of Asian traders and the interest of large farmers had combined  to create
marketing  parastatals, most notably the National  Cereals and Produce  Board, which
could support high producer prices in good times and in bad. Over the years, these
parastatals  drained the budget  and, indirectly, the banking system. Meanwhile,
controls on grain movements  generated  rents for those who granted and obtained
licenses. At the same time, the civil service had expanded  tremendously,  primarily  at
the lower grade levels. Although  real wages stagnated  or fell, the sheer increare in
numbers meant that the total wage bill remained  high. With its protected  industrial
structure  and bloated public sector, the Kenyan  economy  was not unlike many others
in the region.
The over-extension  of the public sector was reflected  in several indicators of
economic  inefficiency. The government  had changed in the early eighties  from being
a nlet  provider of investment  funds to being a net user of private savings  to finance its
investmer.'  and consumption  expenditures. The surplus  in the current budget
dwindled  to zero and the economic  classification  of the budget showed  that a large
10share was taken up by wages and salaries with little left to fund non-wage  operational
and maintenance  expenditures. At the same time, the ICOR increased dramatically
from 3-4 in the early seventies  to 9 and 15 by the early eighties, suggesting  that
proliferation  of the public sector role in the economy,  including the support of poorly
justified projects by government  financial  institutions,  had been highly unproductive.
Several other macroeconomic  indicators  were also poor throughout  the 1970s
and into the 1980s. Kenya suffered severe external terms of trade shocks-a  decline
of 22 percent during 1972-75 (the first oil price shock), an increase of 53 percent in
the next two years (a coffee boom), and a drop of 28 percent by 1980 (the end of the
coffee boom and the second oil price shock). These shocks  were compounded  by poor
macroeconomic  management,  breaking  the tradition  of fiscal responsibility  and
prudent monetary  policy followed  during the first ten years after Independence.  By
1979-80, the public expenditures  to GDP ratio had increased  from its 1973-74 level
of 24 percent to more than 31 percent, fueled largely by increases in school
enrollment,  defense  expenditures,  and investment  in national  entities, such as Kenya
Airways and Kenya Railways. The budget  deficit increased-from a range of 3 to 4
percent in the early 1970s to around 10 percent by 1981. Inflation, which had
averaged 3 percent in the first ten years after Independence,  accelerated  to 13 percent
in 1981 and 22 percent in 1982. Kenya had adjusted its administered  interest rate
structure  only marginally  since 1973, and interest rates ranged from mildly to strongly
negative. The current account deficit as a percentage  of GDP increased from about 4
percent in the early 1970s to 14 percent in 1980. Although  the deficits were filled
largely by long-term concessional  capital flows, borrowing  on relatively hard
11commercial  terms expanded  sharply, increasing  the debt-service ratio from less than 4
percent in 1977 to 13.2 percent in 1980. Macroeconomic  management  was quite
aggressive  in exchange rate depreciation.  The Kenya shilling was linked to the dollar
from 1971 to 1975  and to the special drawing rights (IMF basket of currencies) since
then; with discrete periodic  devaluations,  the real effective  rate, as calculated  by the
IMF, depreciated  nearly 30 percent from 1972  to 1980.
The structural  adjustment program
Evolution  of Bank Lending
It was almost by accident that Kenya came to the Bank for quick-disbursing
money. Although several structural  distortions  were building  up throughout  the 1970s,
the critical trigger point was the financial  imbalances  created by the terms of trade
shocks and by fiscal undiscipline.  The country first sought out the IMF, as it had on
two occasions  since 1975. Terms for a stand-by agreement  were agreed upon in
August 1979, but disbursements  were delayed for a year because the ceilings  on
government  borrowing from the central  bank proved untenable.  With this delay, the
government  needed quick-disbursing  money urgently-which happened  to coincide
with the Bank's own decision to move into medium-term  balance of payments
support, essentially  to help countries adjust to the oil price shock. A planned
industrial sector loan was converted into a structural  adjustment  loan in the
expectation  that it would  effect a quick response  in exports. The response  aid not
12materialize.  Worsening  economic  conditions  forced the government  to return to the
IMF in 1982  and to request a second structural  adjustment  loan from the Bank.
Despite  the fact that reform under the first structural  adjustment  loan was proceeding
slower than planned,  th-t second structural  a6ijustment  loan was ambitious-picking up
the largely unfinished  agenda  on trade reform, and addressing  reforms in grain
marketing, interest rates, energy, and even family  planning.
Although  the economy  stabilized  between 1982 and 1984 (at the expense of
growth and consumption),  little or no progress was made toward structural
adjustment.  While there were design and timing problems, the lack of co-.oliance can
also be traced to the absence of commitment among all but a small cc4.' v.  to,  civil
servants. 3 They clearly underestimated  the strength  of the vested intere .o  verhaps
they also overestimated  the Bank's willingness  to enforce its conditionalities  - the
second tranche of the second  adjustment  loan, although  delayed nine months, was
released  despite questionable  implementation  of the agreed program.  The
unsatisfactory  implementation  led to a pause in adjustment  lending and nearly four
years passed  before another attempt. Given the limited implementation  capacity of the
government,  and in the hopes of building a greater consensus, it was decided  that
adjustment  should  proceed on a sectoral  basis with support from the Bank, while the
IMF would monitor the macroeconomic  balances.
Accordingly,  adjustment  programs were developed  in agriculture (supported  by
two sector loans in 1986  and 1990),  industry (1988), financial  sector (1989), export
development  (1990), and education (1991).  The period from 1986  to 1991 (extended
13to 1992 when relevant) constitutes  the core adjustment  program as discussed  in this
chapter (box 1).
Summary  of progress
The most notable success has been the slow but definite  progress toward
reducing  the protection given to the industrial  sector. Automatic  licensing  was
extended  progressively  to different  import schedules  and tariffs lowered significantly.
These measures  were supported  by a substantial  real exchange  rate depreciation  that
more than reflected terms of trade changes and by the decontrol of prices on most
nonfood  commodities.  With the introduction  of foreign exchange  bearer certificates
and export retention schemes  in 1991-92,  a legal parallel market for foreign  exchange
was created-and  Kenya  reached a stage where it could delicense  import and foreign
exchange  transactions  completely.  Indeed, with progressive import liberalization  and
the evolution  of foreign exchange  markets,  premiums in the parallel markets for
foreign exchange  reached an historical  low by late 1991, and deposits  abroad grew
rapidly.  These developments  suggest  that the rents generated  earlier by the licensing
system were reduced substantially. (However, the official  exchange  rate was allowed
to appreciate  in 1992, and the premium  in the legal parallel markets increased).
Several export development  efforts began or intensified  around 1988-an  export
compensation  scheme, a manufacturing  in bond scheme, and most recently, an import
duty/value  added tax exemption  scheme. An export processing  zone is also currently
being built near Nairobi. On the whole, it is too early to assess the impact  of these
14efforts. But a 10 percent annual increase in the quantum  index of manufaltured
exports between 1985 and 1991 on the heels of a decade of stagnation  can reasonably
be attributed to import liberalization  measures  and currency depreciation  that
undoubtedly  reduced the anti-export bias.
Even in industrial  sector reform-in  which the reduction  of protection was one
successful  component  of the adjustment  program-three large lacunae  remained. First,
tariffs on imports of some competing  goods were still quite high. More importantly
perhaps, the existence  of import licensing, even when 'automatic," created delays,
uncertainties,  and too much discretion.  In particular, parastatals  continued to be
unofficially  protected  by their monopoly  position, higher tariffs, and/or prohibitions
on competing  imports  and ad hoc duty exemptions  on raw materials. Even with these
advantages,  all indicators  of efficiency  and growth show that the parastatal sector
lagged well behind the rest of the economy.  Third, fundamental  legal and regulatory
constraints affected  private entrepreneurs,  including  nebulous  property rights and
unclear procedural recourse. Laws and regulations  on competition  were poorly
enforced, encouraging  the buildup  of market  power.
In the agricultural  sector, the commercial  import of fertilizers was de-licensed,
and fertilizer  prices throughout  the distribution  chain decontrolled.  But aid-financed
fertilizers  continued  to be allocated  in nontransparent  ways. Furthermore, government
disengaged  from output marketing  in only a few minor crops.  The National Cereals
and Produce Board continued  to be a major drain on the budget, despite  direct and
indirect  efforts to reduce its scale of operations; its pricing policies  enabled  it to
outbid private traders in the primary markets  and undercut  them in the secondary
15market. The retail prices of food commodities  were still controlled,  primarily in the
urban areas, conferring  an undifferentiated  subsidy  on urban consumers.  Efforts to
increase the share of nonwage  expenditures  in the sector were  largely urnsuccessful,
threatening  the effectiveness  of such programs as the training and visit extension
system-which is c;itical to increasing  land yields in a country where the population
pressure on available  arable land is increasing.
Fiscal management  was uneven; by the late eighties, the stabilization  trend of
the early years of the decade was completely  reversed.  By FY91, the budget deficit
was as high as in FY81, and the financing  of large deficits that reemerged  through
domestic  borrowing and money  creation was inflationary  and progressively  crowded
out the private sector.  Despite  the initiation  of a "budget  rationalization"  program in
1985, the share of non-wage  expenditures  declined, primarily because of the claims
made by civil service salaries and domestic  debt servicing. The external accounts
also deterior..ed in the late eighties, partly because  of a decline in terms of trade.
The country's debt increased  by 50% during this period, and despite a general
softening  of terms, the debt service ratio, reached 30%, compared with the 13% in
1980.
In the financial  sector an increase in real interest rates was sustained, with a
virtual liberalization  in 1991. But this achievement  turned into a mixed blessing  by
continuing  fiscal laxity. The large budget deficits that reemerged were financed
essentially  by "arranged"  placement  of government  securities  with financial
institutions  at increasing  interest rates. Consequently,  the govemment's domestic
interest payments  grew nearly twice as fast as its domestic  debt, doubling the share of
16intelest payments  relative to GDP. At the same time, the formal credit markets
remained segmented-credit ceilings  continued for the private sector, a real
secondary  market for government  paper did not develop, parastatals  continued  to have
priority access to credit, and development  finance institutions,  including  the
agricultural  credit agencies, remained  insulated  from the rest of the financial  sector.
Thus, liberalization  of interest rates in one sector did not ensure that financial
resources were allocated  efficiently.  Further, distressed  banks were not restructured
successfully-and in fact thcir list grew. While prudential  and regulatory  mechanisms
were strengthened,  political interference  stifled  their implementation,  and led the
country into a bankir,, cis-s  in the early nineties.
In the social sectors, reform, although  headed in the right direction had barely
begun.  As mentioned  earlier, these sectors received relatively  high funding  by the
government. Thus, social sector reform was focused  on how resources can be
allocated  equitably  and efficiently  as the demands  of a growing population  increase,
and on improving  cost recovery.
Macroeconomic  Reform: Policy  and Implementation
Due to the two oil crises in the seventies,  there was a sharp deterioration  in
terms of trade.  Additionally,  in the wake of the coffee boom of 1977-78,  fiscal
discipline  eroded.  As a rest&lt  of these developments  in the early eighties, Kenya was
characterized  by large financial  imbalances. In 1981, the excess of domestic demand
over domestic  product was 11.4 percent of GDP, and the current account  deficit was
1712.5 percent of GDP. The total absorption  of foreign savings (including  grants) was
13.3 percent of GDP, which financed  over 40 percent of domestic investment. The
budget  deficit was 10 percent of GDP, and inflation  was over 20 percent.  The high
current account  deficits of the late 70s and early 80s were financed  by a record level
of borrowing  from private sources which caused the debt service ratio to increase  by
more than 10 percentage  pints  to over 25 percent during 1980-83. These financial
imbalances  were unprecedented  and unsustainable.
The period 1980-84  was characterized  by a steady reduction  in excess demand
- the excess of domestic  expenditures  over income fell from 11 percent to less than 2
percent. This reduction  was achieved mainly by reducing  the budget deficit (see
figure 1) by sharply reducing  expenditures,  including  public investment. The
reduction in excess demand was supported  by decelerating  monetary  growth, rising
interest rates, and tightening  of import controls.  As a result, by 1984, real domestic
demand was 5 percent less than in 1980  despite a population  increase of 17 percent,
and the further deterioration  of external terms of trade.  The budget  deficit and the
current account deficit declined to about 4 percent of GDP, and inflation  decelerated
to 10 percent and interest rates turned positive in real terms.  This was achieved
without  any significant  increase  in revenues  or exports; in fact the revenue/GDP  ratio
declined  as did export volume. Kenya  was among the minority  of countries  which
successfully  reduced financial  imbalances  toward sustainable  levels although  at
considerable  cost, namely the reduction  of consumption,  investment  and imports.
Macroeconomic  management  in the latter half of the 1980s was
uneven-essentially reversing the progress made from 1980 to 1984. The ratio of the
18budget  deficit to GDP clearly increased (figure 1), reaching  by 1991 the level of the
early 1980s. The inflationary  policy of financing  large deficits through domestic
borrowing and money creation  crowded out the private sector. Inflation  accelerated  to
20 percent in 1991 from its 1986 rate of less than 7 percent. Because  banks continued
to finance the government's  generally  loose fiscal stance, the share of domestic  credit
available to the private se'.tor fell steadily  from 75.4 percent in 1980 to 56.6 percent
in 1990. This was achieved mainly through  credit ceilings  on lending to the private
sector, and involuntary  finance to the government  through  de facto requirements  that
bank and nonbank  institutions  invest heavily in government  paper.
A similar picture emerges from an examination  of the external accounts. After
falling to less than 3 percent in 1986, the current account  deficit to GDP ratio
increased in 1989 to levels nearly comparable  to the early eighties  before declining
again (see figure 1). Part of explanation  is to be found in the external terms of trade,
which despite substantial  improvements  in a few years, declined for most of the
eighties. Thess trends increased the country's outstanding  debt by 50 percent during
the period. The reduction in the share of borrowing from private sources during the
stabilization  period was reversed in the latter half of the 1980s-its sniare  increased
from 20 percent to 25 percent. Nevertheless,  the debt service ratio remained  fairly
constant, due to a general softening  of terms (especially  from bilateral donors), an
increase in maturity, the grace period, and debt forgiveness  totalling $752 million.
19Fiscal policy: expenditure  control and composition
Fiscal policy has been the single most critical variable in macroeconomic
management  yet it is also its Achilles heel. At the heart nf Kenya's fiscal problem is
its inability  to control expenditures,  rather than its inability  to generate sufficient
revenue. The tax to GDP ratio hovered  around 22 to 23 percent for most of the
decade, while the ratio of recurrent expenditures  increased quite dramatically  (figure
1). The inability to control expenditures  was due in part to how the composition  of
expenditures  was structured, but also in part to a general lack of discipline  in
expenditure  allocation and execution.
The structural  components  caused  either downward  inflexibility  in expenditures
or an upward pressure. Downward  inflexibility  characterized,  for example, the civil
service wage bill, which accounted  for 6 percent of GDP during the 1980s. Upward
pressure came from the growing demands  of teacher salaries and interest payments,
particularly  on domestic debt of the central government  and the parastatals (table 1).
These problems  cannot be resolved quickly or easily-but  the govemment  did not
make even the smallest  dent in the eighties. The escalating  share of these payments
severely reduced the share of the nondefense,  nonwage  expenditures,  as well as
limited the allocations  to the education  and health sectors.
Fiscal policy was also thwarted  by the absence of clear expenditure  priorities
and the political  will to control expenditures.  One result was that expenditure  ceilings
set by the Treasury were repeatedly  violated. Government  functions  also proliferated;
with a sharp increase in the number  of departments  and divisions, coordination
20became  unwieldy.  Much  of the proliferation  came  after  the district  focus  program  was
adopted  in 1983,  whereby  all central  governmeniL  functions  were fully  represented  at
the district level.
The structural  problems  associated  with  expenditure  control  in the government
were  pervasive.  Yet the government  focussed  only on budgetary  processes.  In 1985,  it
launched  the budget  rationalization  program  to introduce  better  planning  and discipline
into  resource  programming  and expenditure,  seeking  a greater  balance  between
developmental  and current  spending,  and between  wage  and nonwage  expenditures.
The budget rationalization  program also sought to target scarce managerial  and
financial  resources on a smaller number  of critical "core" investment  projects.
The budget rationalization  program achieved some success in procedural  areas.
For example, ministries  began to issue a forward budget circular that requests
submissions  well in advance  of the forward budget period, and imposes  ceilings  on
expenditures,  including  on wages and salaries. One provision of these circulars
attempts to impose  planning  and budgetary  discipline-that "projects  and programs not
included  in the first year of the forward budget will not be considered for inclusion  in
the draft estimates  for the next fiscal year." Within these parameters, ministries
prioritized their submissions  to the treasury. In turn, the treasury began to monitor
central government  expenditures  more effectively.
Yet the budget rationalization  program did not improve resource allocation.
Between 1981 and 1986, nonwage  operations  and maintenance  expenditures  as a
percentage  of total recurrent expenditures  declined from 36 percent to 26 percent.
After the budget  rationalization  program  was introduced,  it declined further to 22
21percent (table 1). Lacking  nonwage  funds, the ministries  relied increasingly  on the
development  budget-particularly its donor-financed  component-to finance their
recurrent expenditures.  The share of recurrent expenditures  going to civil service
payments remained  high and that of interest payments, and teacher salaries increased.
It became  clear that without  more fundamental  reforms, merely procedural  reform
was not effective. Also coming up short was investment  targeting at "core" projects to
ensure that they are fully funded.  One of the problems  was determining  what a core
is, particularly  given that much of the investment  oudget  was donor-financed. But
even when a core program was "defined", allocations  were substantially  less than
.greed upon. 4
Fiscal policy: revenue generation  and composition
As mentioned  earlier, Kenya's revenue-generation  effort compares  favorably
to those in lower-to middle-income  countries. The structure of taxes is more mature
than in most Sub-Saharan  countries-it is more diversified  and does not rely heavily
on international  and production  taxes. The elasticity  of revenues with GDP has been
estimated to range between  0.8 and 1.1, which is relatively  good, although  the
government  has often introduced  discretionary  measures  to maintain  the high ratio of
revenue to GDP.
Rather than to raise additional  revenue relative to GDP, the tax reform
program sought primarily  to simplify  the tax structure, lower high tax rates that may
22wncourage  evasion and discourage  investment,  strengthen  tax administration,  and
increase the use of user charges, particul&rly  in health and education.
Efforts to simplify the tax structure  and reduce unduly high rates focused  on
the import tax structure  and on company  taxation. The government  was successful  in
both reducing  the company  income tax from 52% hi 1989  to 37.5% in 1992, and the
average unweighted  import tariff as part of the trade liberalization  proc' ss (Box 2). In
1990, the government  also introduced  a uniform 18 percent value added tax on the
output and inputs for several products. The coverage was broadened to cover more
products and services as well.  Also in 1990, the government  sought to improve tax
collection  by introducing  the tax modernization  program, attempting  to strengthen  the
analytica' c-apacity  and operational  efficiency  of the tax departments  and to
compUtitize  be  tax system.
Monetary  policy and deficit financing.
As in many developing  countries, the central bank of Kenya has limited scope
for designing  and implementing  monetary  policies  independently  of the treasury's
financing  needs. It is forced to accept such financing  requirements  and then to
discharge its remaining  responsibilities  residually.
During the stabilization  period of 1981-1984,  the sharp decline in deficit
financing  requirements  was reflected  primarily in a decline  in foreign borrowing;
domestic  financing  changed only slightly (table 2). The share of the private sector in
domestic  credit fell sharply (from 67 percent to 61 percent); part of the stabilization
23was thus made possible  by "crowding  out" the private sector. During the latter half of
the 1980s, when large budgetary  deficits reemerged, all forms of financing  increased,
and credit to the economy  expanded  at a much faster rate. And, sti1l,  the share of the
private sector continued  to decline. Thus, the increase in domestic  financing  had
predictable  e2fects-an acceleration  of inflation  and the continued  tightening  of access
to credit by the private sector.  Econometric  work (covering  the period 1965-88)
substantiate  the crowding  out effect.  Killick  and Mwega (1990)  estimated  that an
increase  of KSh 1 million in banking system  credit to the public sector resulted in a
reduction  in credit to the private sector of KSh 0.36 million.
From 1986, monetary  policy reform sought  to move from direct instruments  of
control (credit ceilings  on private sector credit, fixed interest rates on government
paper, and compulsory  secondary  liquidity  requirements)  to more indirect
instruments-reserve ratios, variable  liquidity ratios, and liberalized, market-based
interest rates. Reform was also targeted at improving  the central bank's control over
the growing number of near bank financial  intermediaries  that were able to
circumvent  restrictions  on interest rate and credit ceilings. In conjunction,
coordination  between the treasury and the central bank was to be improved-both to
implement  monetary  policy and stabilize external shocks  more effectively.
The successful  reforms were in the area of interest rate liberalization. From
1984, maximum  rates on commercial  loans were positive  Li real terms. Over the
years, the interest rate ceilings  on commercial  loans moved  closer to the near bank
financial  intermediaries'  rates. In April 1990, the government  went a step further,
abolishing  all charges and fees from the ceiling  on commercial  bank loan rates;
24effective  rates could thus exceed the ceiling  significantly.  In July 1991  an auction
market for government  bills and bonds was established.
Other reform measures  include the introduction  of cash reserve ratios (6
percent since 1986), and the imposition  of 20 and 24 percent liquidity ratios on
commercial  banks and near bank financial  intermediaries  respectively,  consisting  of
cash, deposits  with the central  bank and other domestic  banks, and treasury bills-the
latter must constitute  at least 50 percent of liquidity  requirements. The government
also instituted  a rediscount  window that allowed treasury  bills and other government
paper with three months  or less to maturity to be discounted.  The central bank
discount rate was set at 1.5 to 2.5 points above the latest treasury bill rate.
It appears that progress in monetary  policy reform was a mix of old and new
measures  but direct controls on private credit, pressure on commercial  banks and near
bank financial  intermediaries  to hold treasury bills above the liquidity requirement,
and pressure on government-owned  funds such as pension and social security funds
and insurance  companies  to buy long-term govermment  paper, remained  the main
instruments.  The "arranged"  placement  of securities  hindered  the emergence of a true
secondary  market for government  paper. The only market was for bonds nearing
maturity (which can be used as bank reserves) traded by a few large banks as part of
their money market activities. While this policy probably enabled  the government  to
pay a lower interest rate on its borrowing than would have been necessary  in a truly
open market, large fiscal deficits contributed  to an increase in the government's
domestic  interest burden, which tripled as a share of GDP during the 1980s (table 1).
25Trade Reform
Import liberalization
Import liberalizati%.n  has a checkered  history in Kenya  and arguably,
significant  and sustained  progress was made only in the past few years. Import
substitution  behind protective  barriers and "Kenyanization"  through state participation
were the main principles of industrialization  in Kenya. The beginnings  of industrial
protection (particularly  for manufacturing)  date back to after the war, when the
government  erected a structure  of protective tariffs that were tailor-made to the needs
of the particular transnational  which it was trying to attract. In 1963, Kenya  became
part of the customs  union with Uganda  and Tanzania, straining  the perpetuation  of the
system of favors through tariffs. Rather, selective  import quotas replaced tariffs as the
primary instrument  of protection. The system continued  even after the dissolution  of
the customs  union in 1977. The fourth development  plan (1979-84), subsequently
recognized  that the industrialization  strategy would have to move to a more
outward-oriented  approach. To that end it called for removing  quantitative
restrictions, reducing  tariffs and their dispersion, and establishing  a flexibly  managed
exchange  rate  to support  import liberalization  and export promotion.
Between 1980  and 1984, the fourth  plan strategy formed the immediate  basis
for attempting  two trade reforms-the  phased replacement  of quantitative  restrictions
with equivalent  tariffs, and the subsequent  tariff rationalization  to provide a more
uniform and moderate  structure  of tariff protection. Yet after an initial round of
26liberalization,  the government  halted its reform  progress and actually regressed,
reintroducing  import controls for some  items when the balance of payments
deteriorated. Moreover, to the extent that quantitative  restrictions  were removed,
tariffs were raised on restricted  items, some to over 100 percent. In addition, during
the extreme foreign  exchange  crisis of 1982-84, tariffs were increased by 10 percent
across the board.
This episode of import liberalization  was not successful  for several reasons.
First, the attempts at liberalization  coincided  with a macroeconomic  crisis and later, a
period of rapid stabilization,  and trade policy became  hostage  to the needs of
stabilization.  The Central Bank was justifiably  concerned  that the removal of QRs
would result in loss of control over the balance of payments, given a low level of
reserves.  Second, there was no movement  on the real exchange  rate: small nominal
devaluations  were overwhelmed  by high inflation  during this period.  An increase  in
the rate of export compensation  (see Export Promotion),  designed to compensate  for
lack of improvement  on the real exchange  rate, did not function  very well.  In terms
of design, there was a paucity of data; th, most recent estimates  of effective
protection  were for 1968, and the program was launched  before completing  the
necessary  homework. As a result, the imposition  of high tariffs on some  goods and
reduction  on others were all done in an ad hoc manner.
Yet the government  did make some  progress. The share of imports under the
quota-free category increased  from 24 percent in 1980  to 48 percent in 1985: the
average tariff rate was lowered by about 8 percent, and a more transparent,  less
27arbitrary system of import licensing  was established,  in which import items were
allocated  to either an unrestricted  list (schedule  I) or a restricted list (schedule  II).
In 1988, another attempt was made to liberalize  imports. The reform program
sought first to reclassify  imports into five categories: schedule  I (unrestricted
licensing),  II, and IIIA, B, and C, reflecting  progressively  strict licensing
requirements.  Over the years, progress toward de-licensing  imports was fairly
dramatic. Automatic  or unrestricted  licensing  was extended to schedules  II, IIIA, and
IIB.  By 1991, quantitative  restrictions  affected  only 22 percent of all importable
items, compared with 40 percent in 1987, and only 5 percent of imports, compared
with 12 percent in 1987. These shares fell further when several items were moved
from mc to IIIB in July 1991, so that the only goods left in IIIC were those
restricted for health or public safety reasons. Moreover, while quantitative  restrictions
covered most of the manufacturing  production  in 1985-86, they covered only 28
percent in 1990-91. Thus, the reform  effort to remove licensing  controls was more
far-reaching than during the earlier attempt at liberalization.  (box 2)
Tariff reform was also generally  impressive:  the highest tariff rate was reduced
from 135 percent to 60 percent, the number  of tariff categories  was reduced from 25
to 12, and tariff rates on noncompeting  imports were lowered. These measures  were
somewhat  counterbalanced  by the increase  in some tariffs to ensure protection  when
automatic licensing  was introduced, and when items were moved  from the most
restricted  list to automatic  licensing. Overall, production-weighted  tariffs fell from
62% in 1989-90  to 45.5% in 1991-92.
28The second attempt at import liberalization  was relatively  successful  for
several reasons. In the intervening  three years between the two attempts, a sector
study by the Bank  developed  a solid understanding  of the structure of industry  and its
effective  protection, and yielded a detailed design of components  of reform, based on
discussions  with an inter.ninisterial  committee.  Considerable  effort went into building
a more genuine commitment  on the part of the Government. The reforms were
sequenced  and implemented  with careful coordination  with exchange  rate changes.
Later, the liberalization  process was complemented  by other initiatives  in export
promotion,  and by an improved  incentive  structure  resulting from price decontrol.
But the liberalization  process was not complete. Although  the tariff rates
introduced  with automatic  licensing  were generally  less than the estimated  equivalent
tariffs, they were on the higher end, and needed to be lowered to reduce effective
protection  further. Moreover the import licensing  system was not entirely dismantled
and was subject to considerable  executive  discretion. For example, even for items
eligible for automatic licensing, foreign  exchange  authorizations  were to be obtained,
and foreign exchange  was actually released  only with a lag. From time to time,
depending  on the level of reserves, these licenses and authorizations  took longer to
obtain or were denied. 5 A 1992 Bank survey on the costs to firms of annual  licensing
requirements  (equivalent  of a 5 percent tax on turnover)  indicated  that import licenses
were the main determinant  of licensing  burden. Equally  vexing were the continued  ad
hoc import duty exemptions  to nonexporters-encouraging  favoritism  and
discrimination,  and creating revenue losses.
29Exchange  rate management
The management  of the exchange  rate in Kenya  in the latter half of the 1980s
was effective. The Kenya shilling  was pegged to the special drawing rights basket of
currencies, with weights  reflecting Kenya's trading pattern. Since the outset of
stabilization  in the early 1980s, the government  pursued a flexible  exchange  rate
policy (table 3). Although  the real exchange  rate remained  relatively  constant between
1982 and 1985, it depreciated  by more than 40 percent in the latter half of the
eighties (by more than the decline  in the terms of trade), and the black market
premium declined from 110 percent in late 1987 to 17 percent in the third quarter of
1991 (figure 2). In October 1991, taling a significant  step towards creating a legal
free market for foreign exchange, the government  issued foreign exchange  bearer
certificates. Under the system, anyone  changing  foreign currency not derived from
exports was entitled to a certificate which could be exchanged  for foreign exchange  in
the future at the ruling exchange  rate.  In addition, if it had been held for more than 3
months, additional  foreign exchange  equivalent  to the LIBOR  rate applied to the face
value of the certificate  could be bought. In August 1992, a 100  percent export
retention scheme was introduced  for exporters  of nontraditional  goods; in November
1992, this was expanded  to cover exporters  of traditional  crops at a rate of retention
of 50 percent. The retained foreign exchange  was freely tradeable but had to be used
for "approved  transactions"  and had to take place within the banking system.
The markets for foreign  exchange  certificates  and export-retention  earnings
were clearly an alternative  to the official market, particularly  for repatriation  of
30dividends  and other transfers. But they have also created anomalies. In 1992, for
example, the real official  exchange  rate was allowed  to appreciate,  and both the
alternate markets displayed  premiums from  30 to 50 percent, creating opportunities
for speculation.  More important, many importers were reluctant  to buy foreign
exchange in these markets, fearing that those who had access to the official market
would undercut  them in price, and because of a lack of confidence  that the central
bank would in fact be in a position to redeem the foreign exchange  certificates.
Perhaps the most significant  constraint on the expansion  of free foreign
exchange markets was the persistence  of import controls  despite significant  trade
liberalization.  Even importers who used their own foreign  exchange wero required to
obtain import licenses  under a "green channel"  that supposedly  was quicker than the
normal channel-and a letter of release from the Ministry of Commerce. This
structure  allowed for manipulation,  uncertainty,  and discretion.
Export promotion
During much of the 1980s, a significant  anti-export bias for nontraditional
goods prevailed, essentially  for manufactures  i.e. the effective  duty on imports  was
significantly  higher than the subsidy  given to non-traditional  exports.  The export
compensation  scheme  that had been operational  since 1974 was largely ineffective,
marred by frequent changes and delays, and benefiting  only a few large exporters.
Four top exporters  received the lion's share  of payments.  The flat 20 percent rebate
31overcompensated  or undercompensated  various exporters, and because the rebate was
made arbitrarily, it left out a large number of potential  exporters.
In 1988, the government  introduced  the manufacturing  under bond scheme,
allowing  customs  authorities  to waive import duties and taxes on imported materials
used as input for the  production  of export goods. Yet the fact that this facility was
available  only to export-specialty  firms limited its attractiveness,  as did its
cumbersome  procedures  and high costs.  In 1990, a more general import duty/value
added tax exemption  scheme  based on a negative  list was introduced, whereby
eligibility  would be expanded  and exemptions  be based on specific  export contracts or
previous export performance.
The2e  specific  tax exemption  measures  were complemented  by regulatory
reform to centralize  and consolidate  several licensing  procedures  for exports and
general trade, and by simplified  procedures for new investments.  In 1990,
construction  of an export processing  zone near Nairobi began. Its users will receive
other advantages-an exemption  from income tax for ten years, unrestricted  foreign
ownership and employment  of foreigners, and complete  control over foreign  exchange
earnings.
It is too early to assess the impact  of these measures.  A greater number of
firms began to use the manufacturing  under bond scheme, and the demand for the tax
exemption  scheme increased. The export processing  zone was not yet operational,  but
three other privately owned  export processing  zones emerged  and became  operational.
32The import liberalization  measures  of recent years reduced the antiexport  bias;
also,  the more aggressive  management  of the exchange rate probably increased the
absolute profitability  of exports. These developments-rather than the more recently
introduced  export promotion  measures-are likely to have been the prime
determinants  of the 10 percent growth in the quantum  index of manufactured  exports
between 1985 and 1990.6
Price decontrol and regulatory policy
Price controls in Kenya  predate World War 11.  However, the first formal
legislation  was the Price Control Ordinance of 1956, later renamed the Price Control
Act of 1972-which also served as the model for the current price control framework.
Although  the range of price-controlled  commodities  was revised, its procedures  and
regulations  were incorporated  largely "as is" into the Restrictive  Trade Practices,
Monopolies  and Price Control Act of 1988. This act applied to both the private and
public sector enterprises,  but did not cover infrastructure  services, the prices of which
were controlled  by the relevant line ministries.  Price controls operated both at the
production  and the retail level, depending  on the commodity.  Price controls on staple
foods were imposed to protect lower income groups, while the main reason for price
controls on manufactures  was to protect against monopolistic  pricing practices.
Prices have been decontrolled  extensively,  especially  since 1986. Between
1983  and 1991, the number of controlled  products  under the general order fell from
56 to 6, and those under the specific  order fell from 87 to 29. Price decontrol was a
33continuous  process, and the government  nimbly seized the right market and political
opportunities.  Price decontrols were gearea primarily  towards manufactured  goods,
while controls on consumer  prices of staple-s  continued  to exist, except on some items
as sugar and milk. However, cost-plus pricing (based on outdated  data) continued to
guide price setting for prices still controlled  in the manufacturing  sector, and there
was no provision for the automatic  adjustment  for inflation  or in price changes for
intermediate  inputs.  Nor had a procedure bt  . established  for appeal. Prices were set
for each enterprise, and delays in price changes  increased during the 1980s.
A legal and regulatory framework  that provides clarity, certainty, and
predictability  is necessary  to give the private sector enough confidence  to enter
economic  activities. In addition, laws must be framed and enforced whereby the
transaction  cost of arriving at and renegotiating  various contracts are reasonable. The
minority  population  of entrepreneurs  of Asian origin in Kenya should perceive that
they have access to a "level  playing field."  Welcome  but muted efforts have been
made since 1986 to improve the legal and regulatory  setting-establishing a one-stop
office in the Investment  Promotion  Center to simplify  and hasten approval of new
investments,  simplifying  trading (including  export) procedures, and allocating  foreign
exchange for repatriation. But these measures-modifications,  really-have  not
addressed the fundamental  legal and regulatory  constraints  that affect private
entrepreneurs. For example, in approving  the acquisition  and subdivision  of irban
land, local authorities  often asked for the surrender of the freehold title in exchange
for 99-year leasehold titles. Moreover, the minister  of finance could arbitrarily
approve takeovers, set prices, order divestitures,  appoint or dismiss board members
34and trustees, and overturn the decisions  of regulatory  bodies. Guidelines  for
determining  violations  of labor and employment  laws were also absent-and  the
arbitrariness  of import duty exemptions  has already been referred to.
But the most critical constraints  on private sector competition  and economic
efficiency  were the laws governing  entry, exit, and operational  flexibility.  A!though
competition  policy had been set in legislation,  the existence  of market power,
extensive  vertical integration,  and a highly concentrated  wholesaling  system suggest
that enforcement  was weak. Important market segments  in the Kenyan  economy  were
controlled  by single monopolies,  generally  parastatals,  or by just a few producers.
Nearly 60 percent of sales in the economy  was estimated  to occur in oligopolistic
markets; in manufacturing,  it was about 40 to 50 percent. Moreover, most
manufacturers  were prohibited  from marketing  directly to retailers or the public, thus
protecting  the marketing  power of parastatals-and nowhere was this more pervasive
than in the agricultural  sector. Exit laws were essentially "winding  up"
policy-focusing on the disposition  of assets without  any provision for interim  legal
protection  to reorganize. In practice, adjudication  took four to ten years, placing
enterprises in limbo as their operation came to a standstill  and their assets were tied
up.
Finally, empirical work indicates  that licensing  requirements  imposed
significant  monetary  and transacions costs on firms (table 4). A survey of enterprises
showed  that the cost of annual licenses-including direct license fees, agent fees and
bribes, and transaction  costs for enterprise staff time-was  very high both as an
absolute amount and as a proportion  of sales; moreover, the relative cost of licenses
35varied inversely  with the size of the enterprise, with small firms paying as much as
9.4 percent of their turnover. Compounding  these costs was the proliferation  of
business licenses required by local authorities.
Flnancial sector poUcy  and reform
The financial  system in Kenya in the mid-1980s was fairly well developed,
comprising  24 commercial  banks, 54 near bank financial  intermediaries,  207 hire
purchase companies, 32 societies,  53 .nsurance  companies,  and more than 1,000
savings  and credit cooperative  societies. In addition, there were ten development
finance institutions,  a large post-office savings bank, and a national social security
fund. The formal financial  system had mobilized  domestic  financial  resources
effectively: M2/GDP was around 30 percent, about the same as in other
medium-growth  developing  countries, and representing  an increase from 24 percent in
1968.
In the early 1980s, concerns about a large foreign presence  in the system
prompted a relaxation  in licensing  requirements, and small locally  owned banks,
building societies  and near bank financial  intermediaries  proliferated. Anomalies  in
the banking law also made it possible for commercial  banks to set up near bank
financial  intermediaries,  and thus to circumvent  restrictions  on banking activities  and
interest-rate ceil'ings.  Indeed, because near bank financial  intermediaries  were not
subject to statutory  reserve requirements  and were allowed to borrow and lend at
higher rates, they attracted deposits  away from commercial  banks. Many of these new
36institutions  were promoted actively  with funding  deposits from the political  and
administrative  elite, particularly  those responsible  for state-owned  enterprises. In the
absence of prudential  regulation  and with poorly enforced  regulations  on capital and
reserves requirements,  four commercial  bank groups which owned prominent  near
bank financial  intermediaries  failed in 1986. By 1989, 4 other commercial  banks and
24 near bank financial  intermediaries  were in trouble, 7 of which appeared to be
insolvent.  If liquidated, the losses of these 28 institutions  would range between an
estimated  $105 to $178 million.
The credit market was m *:e  segmented  than appeared, given the number  and
range of financial  institutions. 7 Four large commercial  banks operated as a
"gentleman's  club," retaining  strong ties to multinational  and blue chip companies,
and adhering to conservative  lending  practices. The rest were weak; to survive they
sought out new, risky businesses. Under significantly  weak  prudential supervision
and since the near bank financial  intermediaries  were subject to higher interest rate
ceilings  than were commercial  banks, they could undertake  riskier ventures. Six
development  finance  institutions  set up by the government  in the 1960s  and 1970s
directed  credit to specific  sectors for long-term investment. They were largely
unprofitable  and unsustainable,  suffering serious  portfolio  problems. In the
agricultural sector, influential  large farmers  preempted the resources of the
Agricultural  Credit Corporation  and rarely paid them back-in  essence  being
subsidized  heavily by the budget. And credit to the private sector was limited  by the
government's  preemption  of credit for financing  its budget deficits and those of its
parastatals, such as the National  Cereals and Produce  Board.
37The government  amended  the Banking  Laws in 1989-narrowing the
regalatory gap between classes of institutions,  imposing  more stringent  licensing
requirements  on banks and near bank financial  intermediaries,  increasing  minimum
capital requirements,  establishing  the Deposit Insurance  Fund, setting guidelines  for
loan provisioning  and minimum  financial  disclosure  requirements, and increasing
penalties for violation. The government  sought  to strengthen  the central bank's
technical  and managerial  capacity  to inspect, monitor,  and supervise  the financial
system. And, in the first phase of the reform initiative,  nine small banks were
restructured.
The legislative  reform measures  had little impact. The technical  capacity of the
supervisory  department  of central bank was improved, but political forces continued
to weaken its enforcement,  even as the number of banks and institutions  in difficulty
grew. It was estimated  that 11 banks and 20 near bank financial  intermediaries,
accounting  for about 25 to 50 percent of nonperforming  loans, and for about 60
percent of total assets, were in distress in 1992. The consolidation  and restructuring
of nine banks was delayed  and undercut  by political factors to a point at which the
institutions  were stripped  of their assets. The consolidated  bank itself became a
troubled institution. In retrospect,  it appears that most depositors  had already shifted
their deposits  to the stronger institutions,  and the large depositors  were paid off in
equity or bonds. A large number  of banks and near bank financial  intermediaries
continued  to operate with capital ratios well below the required minimum,  and
required cash and liquid-asset  ratios were widely  ignored. with supervisory  penalties
conspicuously  absent. 8
38The effects of interest rate liberalization  in the banking sector on monetary
policy has already been discussed.  In a broader sense, the reform program did not
reduce the rigidities  in the allocation  of credit; thus, interest rate liberalization  had
little effect on improving  the efficiency  of credit allocation,  which would be the
primary objective.  As discussed  earlier, there is no clear evidence that interest rate
liberalization  generally  increased  either the profitability  or solvency  of financial
institutions. It probably did help improve the profitability  of a few already solvent
banks, but higher interest rates did not support the profitability  of the large number of
distressed  commercial  banks and near bank financial  intermediaries  because their
clients were not servicing  their debts anyway.
Agricultural  Marketing  Reform
Kenya was one of the few African  colonies in which Europeans  became
involved  in land ownership,  agricultural  production,  and exports. The pattern of land
ownership and produce marketing  from colonial  days continued in some ways-for
example, dualistic land ownership  and marketing  structures.  Between 1931 and 1959,
about 3 million  hectares  of high-potential  and medium-potential  land were set aside
for exclusive  European  occupation  and cultivation,  and these farmers provided most
of the country's exports of food and beverage  crops. Under pressure from white
settler farmers, the government  established  a system of marketing  boards that paid at
least export realization-and often well above-for  all crops. African farmers limited
to nonscheduled  areas were not allowed to grow cash crops or keep grade cattle. The
39net effect was a rigid dualistic  agricultural  system of land ownership,  production,  and
marketing.
Of course some of the features of this system changed. Before Independence
the colonial government  began to encourage  smallholder  production  of cash crops, a
process that the government  hastened  considerably  after Independence.  The
government  bought, subdivided,  and settled smaller farmers on about a half million
hectares  in settlement  schemes. Indeed, the distribution  of land to and support for
smallholder  farming was the basis for the excellent  performance  of Kenyan  agriculture
in the 1960s  and 1970s. Nevertheless,  the strongly  dualistic nature remained  with two
attendant  features. First, with a few exceptional  years, the prices paid to producers of
the major food and export crops were maintained  in real terms and at close to import
or export parity as appropriate  (table 5). There was little discrimination  against
agriculture in this respect, although  the protection  given to industry and an overvalued
exchange  rate in some years meant that the terms of trade for agriculture were less
favorable than they would have been otherwise.
Second, the presence  of the grain marketing  parastatal-the  National Cereals
and Produce  Board-continued to be pervasive, despite the recommendations  of at
least seven commissions  since 1942 to reduce the role of the state in grain marketing.
Inter-district movement  of grain continued  to be controlled. Large maize farmers
benefited  from guaranteed  high prices, while many bureaucrats  gained rents from
issuing permits for grain movement.  Direct state participation  in and restrictions  on
private sector marketing  and production  extended  to other agricultural  commodities  as
well. The government  directly marketed  several import substitution  crops
40monopolistically:  wheat, rice, cotton, sugar, and milk. In all cases, restrictions  or
outright bans were imposed  on private sector participation.
The sustained,  relatively  high producer prices for maize, together  with smaller
increases  in the price at which the National  Cereals and Produce Board could sell to
millers and the high marketing  costs of the parastatal, had predictable  effects on the
budget (table 6). It is also worth noting the sevenfold  increase  in the deficit per ton of
maize handied-explained in part by the rapid expansion  of National Cereals and
Produce Board depots in the late 1970s  and early 1980s, and a threefold  increase in
staff between 1980 and 1987. In addition  by 1987, the National  Cereals and Produce
Board accumulated  debt exceeding  5 percent of GDP, which was 'written-off'  or
taken over and paid off by the government  in 1988-89.
As with output pricing, controlled  input prices reflected import parity.  For
example, the pricing formula for fertilizer  added margins  and transport costs to a
reference price based on import prices, seed prices were based on the costs of
p-rcEuction,  and the price of agricultural  chemicals  was not controlled. The licensing
of fertilizer imports was the main problem-in  the guise of administering  technical
standards and coordination  with donor-financed  imports, the government  restricted
import licenses to a fairly small number of importers. The result was uncertainty  over
supplies  and poor timing. In addition, price controls down to the retail level reduced
supplies  and penalized  cereal-producing  smallholders,  who did not have access to
institutional  suppliers such as the coffee cooperatives.
41Output marketing
The reform program sought to disengage  the government  from marketing  (and
in some cases, processing). Unfortunately,  the process was slow and tangled; only
dubious success was achieved,  and that with minor crops. Milk prices were
decontrolled,  and restrictions  on private sector processing  and marketing  removed. In
1987-88, the government  eliminated  the cotton marketing  board's monopoly  on paper,
and approved  the divestiture  of its gins and its restructuring  as a regulatory  agency.
No further progress was made. The govemment  also aecided to divest its bacon
factory  and the Kenya meat commission.  While staff were laid off initially, the
comrnission  returned to operations  in 1989. In the sugar sector, no decisions  were
reached, pending the completion  of a subsectoral  study.
The saga of atte npts to reforrn the marketing  of maize, the most important
food crop, could fill many pages. Grain market reform had the stated aim of having
all domestic trade managed  by private merchants  with deregulated  prices. Various
studies indicated  that the National Cereals and Produce Board had a role-one  limited
to holding minimal amounts  of strategic  reserves for smoothing  sharp increases in
consumer  prices in poor harvest  years. In addition, the National Cereals and Produce
Board would be a buyer of last resort, maintaining  floor prices for producers. The
food security and stabilization  role thus envisaged  for the National Cereals and
Produce Board would  be quite limited-if  its monopoly  on internal trade and on
imports and exports were removed, private trade would be able to assume most of
these functions.
42Both design flaws and a lack of commitment  impeded  reform.  The design
flaw was the inconsistency  between fixing the purchase price close to the import
parity price and reducing  the role of the National  Cereals and Produce Board to a
buyer of last resort.  A price set close to import parity is likely to encourage  most
farmers to choose to sell to the National  Cereals and Produce Boaid. Indeed, the
parastatal then becomes  a purchaser  of (the farmers') first choice, leading to the
accumulation  of stocks, purchased  at prices too high to make export profitable. This
infact occurred repeatedly  in the 1980s. In the early 1980s, grain reserves for several
years were 40 percent to 60 percent higher than the desired level of 270,000 tons.
Later in the decade, when the desired  level was increased to 560,000 tons, actual
stocks were still often 60 to 70 percent higher, even after significant  exports. If the
reform program sought to reduce the role of National Cereals and Produce Board, the
most potent instrument  was the reduction  in the purchase price, perhaps closer to
export parity. Although  terms such as "flexible  pricing" and "improved  pricing
methodology"  were cited in policy documents,  purchase price reduction  was never an
explicitly stated objective.
Instead, other solutions  to the problem were attempted-the quantity  of maize
allowed to be moved without  permit was raised from 2 bags to 44 bags, 70 percent of
the board's buying centers were closed, and mi.lers were allowed to buy an increasing
share of their requirements  directly from traders rather than from the National Cereals
and Produce Board. The National  Cereals and Produce Board was also "restructured,"
which included  a debt write-off in L988.
43Evaluating  the effects of these efforts is problematic,  since defining  and
measuring  what is actually happening  in practice is difficult. Some preliminary
evidence  does seem to indicate that during 1988-91 when movement  controls were
eased, private trade was able to equalize interregional  price disparities, by raising
prices in surplus  areas and by reducing  them in deficit areas. The operating margins
of private trade were clearly lower than those of the National Cereals  and Produce
Board. At the same time, the National Cereals and Produce Board purchases were
lower than in previous years, suggesting  that its role in the market declined. But the
trend was quickly reversed when movement  controls were reimposed  in 1992  and the
procurement  price was jacked up to 110 percent of import parity. At the same tims,
by reopening  buying centers and offering maize to millers at a subsidized  price, the
government  undercut  its own decision to encourage  millers to buy directly from the
market.
The impact  on the National Cereals and Produce Board's finances  is also
unclear. Despite the debt write-off and closing of buying centers, the average cost of
a bag of maize handled  by the National  Cereals and Produce  Board remained high.
Staff-reduction  targets were.  not met, and the National  Cereals and Produce  Board
was still unable to cover its cost of operation, as indicated  by growing deficits. In
addition to a programmed  transfer from the central budget of K£720  million in
1991-92, for example, a further subsidy  of K£200  to 250 million  became
necessary-about 2 percent of all current expenditures.
44Fertilizer marketing
Complete  decontrol  of prices at all levels sin^e 1990 has increased  the number
of fertilizer retailers at interior locations-thus increasing  availability,  particularly  at
the retail level, where margins  had been badly squeezed  in the past. In 1991, fertilizer
imports were transferred from schedule  II to schedule  I and became unrestricted.  It is
unclear whether this move increased  the number of licensed  importers. Estimated
fertilizer use declined  between 1989 and 1991. Donor-financed  fertilizers, which
account  for about 60 percent of annual imports, continued  to be "allocated"  in a
process that was neither transparent  nor coordinated  with private demand for
fertilizers. This, together  with continued  uncertainties  about import licensing and
foreign exchange  allocation  and the continued  domination  of the market by
government-owned  distributors,  appears to have discouraged  private traders.
Public  enterprise  reform
The government  held equity in about 250 commercially  oriented  enterprises
producing  goods and services for profit; in over half, the government  was the
majority  equity holder. Equity was held directly in about 50 enterprises;  equity in the
rest was held through government-owned  development  finance institutions.  The single
largest economic  activity of parastatals  was manufacturing;  in 1990, 60 percent of the
enterprises were in manufacturing  and mining,  18 percent in distribution, 15 percent
45in finance, and the rest in transport, other services, and electricity. Between 1986  and
1990, the parastatal sector accounted  for 11 percent of GDP.
While GDP grew overall by 5 percent between 1986 and 1990, value added in
the parastatal  sector grew at only 0.5 percent annually-with negative  growth in the
manufacturing  and mining sectors. (Table 7 provides  indicators of the economic  and
financial  performance  of the public enterprise sector and its relationship  to the rest of
the economy.) Based on a sample  of parastatals  and private enterprises, it is
estimated that total factor productivity  growth during this period was negative for the
parastatal sector, compared  with 5.4 percent for the private sector; the growth of
labor inputs was half that of the private sector, while the growth of capital inputs was
twice as high, indicating  an inefficient  use of resources. Excluding  the profits of the
central bank, net inflows to the central government  budget were  either significantly
negative (-0.9 to -1.1 percent of GDP) or near zero.
While economic  inefficiency  was the most disturbing  characteristic  of the
parastatal  sector, its effects on the budget  and external  accounts  were not negligible.
The sector accounted  for more than a third of the government's net lending and equity
operations and contributed  little revenue: in fact, unremitted  taxes-those collected but
not remitted-estimated to have  been K£45 million  in 1991, or 0.5 percent of tax
revenues. The sector ran a net ti %de  deficit of 28 percent of the total trade deficit.
While the sector did not greatly accentuate  the external  debt and debt service burden,
the efficiency  with which these funds were used is at issue. Furthermore, the
government  often assumed the debt and debt servicing  obligations  of parastatals (K£66
46million  of debt service  payments  were assumed  in 1991),  which often borrowed
externally  without  clearance from the treasury.
Parastatals  do not appear to be a burden on the banking system. But their
demand on or lack of contribution  to budgetary  revenues indirectly  increased the
government's  own budget deficits and its demands  for credit. Too, close ties seemed
to exist between  parastatals  and distressed  banks-distressed banks held an estimated
85 percent of all parastatal  deposits, due to a government  directive that parastatals
place their deposits in such banks and near bank financial  intermediaries.  Conversely,
it also appeared that loans to parastatals  were a source of losses for the distressed
banks. Thus, although  the aggregate  figure s did not exhibit a dangerous
interdependence,  the link between poorly performing  parastatals  and the subset of
distressed banks was in fact quite close.
Finally, the parastatal sector strengthened  the monopolistic  and oligopolistic
structure of industry. Monopolies  were usually parastatal  firms granted such power
through legislation  or administrative  decree. They could exercise this power in sales
or purchases, the latter through marketing  institutions  and boards. Oligopolies
sometimes  consisted  of a combination  of private and public firms. Parastatals  were
often protected  by higher tariffs, effective  (although  not officially  gazetted)
prohibition  on competing  imports, and ad hoc exemptions  on import duties on capital
and intermediate  goods.
Although  several attempts were made to restructure the public enterprise
sector, progress was made only recently. In late 1991, the government  announced  its
intention  to divest its interest in a preliminary  list of 207 enterprises, while retaining
47ownership of 33 "strategic"  enterprises.  Of the 207, it selected  only ten for
privatization  by 1995. Five have actually  been privatized  or brought to the point of
sale. Furthermore, five r  ,.)rity-owned  public enterprises, which accounted  for the
bulk of government  transfers, were to be restructured, including the railways, port
authority, posts and telegraphs,  the tea development  agency, and, again, the National
Cereals and Produce Board. This was a modest  beginning. And, it is unclear that all
the 33 enterprises to be retained in the public sector have "strategic" importance.  But
the greatest source of skepticism  is the inclusion  of the National Cereals and Produce
Board in this list-that  it is being targeted for yet another round of "restructuring."
Civil service reform
In 1990, the mainstream  civil service employed  more than a quarter of million
people-or  about a quarter of urban wage employment.  In the 1980s  civil service
employment  growth slowed to an average of 4.8 percent p.a. after a spurt of 10
percent p.a. during the 1970s. Several  policy measures  have reflected  the strong
pressures to create jobs-guaranteed employment  for university  graduates  and the
tripartite arrangements  of 1964, 1970, and 1979-81, which  called for employment
increases  in the public sector by 15 percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent, respectively.
Further, ad hoc absorption  of staff from the agencies  of the East Africa Community,
the census operations  of 1979, and a large number "works paid" employees  hired
under development  projects have increased  employment.  As may be expected, the
48composition  of the civil service is biased heavily toward low-skilled employees;  only
11 percent are in the middle  or upper management  cadres.
It can be difficult sometimes  to judge whether the expansion  of public
employment  is justified by the corresponding  increase  in the real value of government
services  provided. However, if one takes GDP growth as a rough indicator of demand
for government  services and assumes no decline  in average pru. .ctivity of civil
servants, then increases  in government  employment  far exceed the increase in
demand; the rate of increase  in government  employment  was twice that of GDP.
This steady growth in civil service employment  was, as usually  happens
accompanied  by stagnation  or regression  in the salaries and wages  paid to civil
servants; during the 1980s, in particular, average real wages declined  by over 15
percent, compared with a 7.3 percent decline  in the private sector. The government's
wage policies  helped hold the total civil service wage  bill in check even while
employment  expanded-and in fact served as the (moderate)  wage leader for the entire
modern sector. However, the slow growth in real wages was distributed
unevenly-lower wage grades received  larger percentage  increases. Together with a
"grade creep," this led to a compression  of salary scales, reducing the attractiveness
of government  jobs for professionals  and the highly skilled, as reflected in high
vacancy rates at these levels.
In sum, overstaffing  was not dealt with effectively.  While the government
occasionally  declared hiring freezes ane supposedly  abandoned  its practice of giving
jobs to all university  graduates and graduates  of other training  programs, these
policies were not systematically  implemented.  In any case, overstaffing  occurs
49predominantly  at the lower grade levels, so that reduction in size at this level is likely
to be more important  than restriction  of intake of university  graduates.
Social sector policies
Education
Kenya's educational  system  expanded  rapidly-partly in reaction to the highly
restrictive  and unequal educational  practices of the colonial government,  in part to
accommodate  the extraordinary  growth in the school-going  population. And its basic
indicators  are some of the best in Africa: a 99 percent primary school enrollment  rate,
an enrollment rate of 48 percent among  females, and an adult literacy rate of 60
percent for males and 40 percent for females. Relatedly  public expenditures  on
education  are also among  the highest  in Africa-at  6 percent of GDP. Some 57
percent of public recurrent expenditures  go to primary education; the spirit of
Harambee  or "Let's pull together", has brought  parents into the funding  fold-they
are bearing 56 and 73 percent shares of the capital (and some recurring) costs of
education  at the primary and secondary  levels.
Despite the additional  funds from parental sources, public expenditures  on
education  grew as a share of GDP (table 1)-now  comprising  40 percent of the budget
by FY91.  Public recurrent  expenditures  financed  teacher salaries primarily-real
salaries declined but the number  of teacher  grew at a faster rate than enrollments,  so
that the average  class size was  unusually  small. At the same time, the dropout rate
50was very high: roughly one half of all children  who begin primary education  failed to
complete  it. Thus, there is room for improvement  in efficiency.
Only 1.3 percent of the eligible  population  were enrolled at tile university
level. Yet this subsector  took up 72 percent of capital expenditures  and 18 percent of
recurrent expenditures  ir. the late eighties, (an increase from 11.8 percent in 1985).
Until recently, 30 percent of university  spending  went for student  boarding and other
allowances. Recent structural changes  which made admission  easier, and the fact that
cost-sharing is substantially  lower than in basic education,  contributed  to a very high
private demand. In the last five years, the number of public universities  increased
from 1 to 6.
Kenya faces different financing  issues than do most other African countries,
where the scant public spending  on education  must be increased. In particular, Kenya
must address the high and rising budget share of education,  and its biased distribution
toward universities.  Three broad measures  are paramount: limiting the growth of
teachers  at the primary level, lowering  dropout and repeat rates, and containing  the
public resource demands of the secondary  sectors, particularly  universities.  The first
measure entails three reforms: increasing  class size and teacher workloads,  limiting
the intake of teachers  colleges, and halting the recruitment  of untrained  teachers.
Allocating  public resourc..  quitably would entail introducing  direct costs and
recovering  the full cost of food and boarding, and reforming the student  loan scheme
at the university  level. Public universities  should  also be consolidated,  and new
admissions  restricted  for a period of time.
51In the year since the adjustment  program was initiated, quantitative  limits on
the nuinber of teachers  on the payroll, and the number  and mix of trainees accepted
into training  colleges, were exceeded.  At the university  level, admission  targets were
adhered to, direct charges were instituted  along with need-based bursaries, and some
aspects  of the student  loan scheme (still available to all students)  were restructured to
reduce the amount of personal allowances.
Health
As in education, health indicators  improved  dramatically  after
Independence-an increase  in life expectancy  from 42 to 58 years, a decline in the
crude mortality  rate from 20 to 11 per thousand  population  and a decline  in infant
mortality  from more than 200 to 110 per thousand  live births  The coverage of
immunization  programs  has also grown and drop-out  rates have declined. At the
same time, AIDS has become  a significant  public health disease. Abc  ut 200,000
Kenyans  are now estimated  to be HIV-positive  and about 2,500 new AIDS cases are
oiagnosed  annually.
Historically,  the bulk of the ministry of health  budget was allocated  to
secondary  and tertiary hospital services, leaving few funds for rural health facilities.
And although  the allocated  share of preventive  services  and rural health services
increased  in the late 1980s  by 7 and 11 percentage  points, it still remained  low in
relation to need. Furthermore, actual expenditures  for preventive  and rural services
fell short of allocations-by about 19 percent to 24 percent-while actual spending  for
52curative services was well above 100 percent. The share of recurrent expenditures
devoted to nonwage  expenses such as medical  supplies  has also declined steadily,
from about 28 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in the late 1980s. Only limited user
charges  were in effect until 1989. Moreover, inadequate  maintenance-a systemic
problem-affects rural health facilities  in particular. A survey in 1981 showed  that
less than half of Kenya's rural facilities  had a reliable water supply  and 65 to 70
percent .- re unacceptably  run down.
To meet the increase  in demand  in the face of tight resources, the govemment
has sought to mobilize  additional  resources and to ensure that facilities  are used more
efficiently.  In December 1989, the govemment  introduced  outpatient  and inpatient
user charges at all public sector facilities  except dispensaries;  in July 1990 it
introduced  reforms to the national  hospital insurance fund, a parastatal covering
primarily  wage eamers and their families. User chargers were accompanied  by
waivers  based on ability to pay, and incentives  to facilities  to be able to keep part of
the revenue they generated. The reforms to the insurance  fund made contributions
proportional  to income and increased the coverage.
After the imposition  of user charges, attendance  at facilities fell, but they soon
returned to their previous levels-with one important  exception:  attendance  increased
at dispensaries  and health  centers, and declined  at hospitals.  This was a desirable
outcome. However, public concern about the continued  inadequacy  of facilities  and
the perceptions  that the waiver system was not functioning  properly forced the
government  to reduce or suspend some charges  three months later.  This withdrawal
reduced cost-sharing revenues  by about 50 percent and eliminated  the incentive  to
53seek care first at a lower-level facility. Then, in 1992 fees were reintroduced
progressively  from the national  hospital in Nairobi to district hospitals  and health
centers. And the waivers system was strengthened  and expanded. The government
also increased its budgeted  and actual recurrent spending  by 30 percent between
FY89-92, and the share of total health expenditures  increased from 7.6 percent to
more than 8.5 percent.
The outcomes  of structural  adjustment
Impact on Intermediate  Variables
As shown in table 8, much of the stabilization  gains of the early 1980s  were
lost in the late 1980s-the budget deficit increased  to almost the levels of the crisis
period, and high inflation  reemerged. While the gains in reducing  the external  deficit
were not entirely reversed, the increased  and iiigh debt service ratios indicate the
precariousness  of the extemal balance.
Progress was made in maintaining  positive interest rates and in real exchange
rate depreciation.  With the removal  of price controls, and the maintenance  of
producer incentives  in agriculture, the overall incentive  structure was reasonably
undistorted  in the later 1980s.
54Macroeconomic  and sectoral outcomes
As shown in table 9, from 1980  to 1984  the economy  experienced  a low
growth rate due largely to stabilization  policies  that cut expenditures  sharply-a
decline in the excess of expenditures  over income from 11 percent of CDP in 1980 to
1 percent in 1984 and 1985. Moreover, the low efficiency  of investment  in the late
1970s  led to a high incremental  capital output ratio and a negative  rate of productivity
growth during the early 1980s.
After the slowdown  in the first half of the 1980s, growth resumed and
investment  reflected greater efficiency  in the late 1980s. The increase in efficiency
can be attributed  to a decline  in the rate of (unproductive)  investment  between 1980
and 1984-much of it in the public sector, where the public fixed investment  to GDP
ratio declined by 1.6 percent. The public sector maintained  a lower rate of investment
in the late 1980s.
Yet, despite the decline in the share of public investment, the sector's claims
on private sector savings grew. By the early  1980s, the central government  had
changed from a net saver in the late 1970s  to a consumer of private savings. By the
late 1980s  and early 1990s, the position  deteriorated  steadily. After a sharp decline  in
and prudence  in the use of foreign  savings in the mid-1980s, external resource use
increased  to 4.6 percent in the late 1980s. The conclusion  is that while some public
sector adjustment  occurred  primarily  as a reduction  in the rate of public investment,  it
was inadequate  in terms of placing demands  on both private sector and foreign
savings.
55A growth in private sector savings was directed into financing  the government
deficit rather than private investments;  indeed  the private investment  effort slowed
throughout  the 1980s. This may be indicative  of the stagnation  to be expected in the
early years of adjustment. Yet it may also reflect a continued reluctance  to invest in
the face of regulatory  and other nonprice  barriers, and, more recently, political
uncertainties.
Adjustment  focused  heavily  on the external sector. Import liberalization  was
substantial. The ratio of imports to GDP has increased since the mid-1980s, but not
the share of imports in the domestic  supply of manufactures  (table 9). In fact, this
latter share was lower in the latter part of the adjustment  period than initially,
suggesting  that manufacturing  sector imports  were not liberalized to the same extent
as have other imports. 9 For exports the picture is less clear. The export to GDP ratio
continued  to decline, as did the ratio of manufactured  exports to output-suggesting
that a significant  increase  in export orientation  did not occurred. At best, exports
grew at the same rate as GDP in the second half of the 1980s. But this overall result
is due partly to the still relatively  large share of primary commodities  in the export
structure, for which growth was modest. The rate of manufactured  e-ports  increased
sharply, particularly  in the past few years-suggesting that production may be shifting
from supplying  for mainly  domestic markets to exports of manufacturing.  But the
small share of manufactures  in merchandise  exports-about 20 percent-has  little
impact  on the export/GDP ratio.'0
In agriculture, the rate of output growth, while lower than in the years
following  Independence,  is still quite respectable.  The delicensing  of private fertilizer
56imports and decontrol of i . price could be expected to have a direct effect on
production,  although  the direction of the effect is theoretically  ambiguous:  price
decontrol and thus higher prices might suppress  demand, wider availability  may
reduce prices and increase usage. So far, neither has occurred-usage showed  an
increase till 1990, and a significant  decline  in the next two years. The failure at
rationalizing  public expenditures  (including  a restructuring  of the National Cereals and
Produce  Board) suggests  that priority investments  are underfunded,  as are critical
agricultural services.
Adjustment  and aid
This discussion  of the reform process brings us logically  to another question
about Kenya: whether aid (including  the Bank's) has been overly generous, and
encouraged  the government  to avoid substantial  reform. This question  is difficult to
assess. At the aggregate  level, the net disbursement  of official  development  assistance
per capita to Kenya in 1990-at $41-was  less than for other "favored" African
countries, such as Tanzania  ($47.1), Burundi  ($48.8), and Malawi ($56.3). Yet it was
substantially  higher than net disbursements  to Ghana, ($31.2), Africa's best
performer. Much the same picture emerges for net official development  assistance  as
a share of GDP. At 11.1 percent, Kenya's share is higher than Ghana's (7 percent),
but much lower than in other countries  (48 percent for Tanzania, and about 26
percent for Malawi  and Burundi).  Without making  too much of these numbers, one
can probably say that while the resource use and policy reform behavior  of Kenya
57makes it less deserving  of the aid it obtained than say Ghana, Kenya  does not exhibit
the same extent of aid dependency  as other donor favorites  in the region. At the same
time, it does appear that generous project funding  by several  donors has led to a
public investment  program which, while declining  as share of GDP, is not well
prioritized. Even more critical, the growing reliance on grants and counterpart funds
has also undoubtedly  contributed  to higher consumptisDi  expenditures  by the
government,  particularly  on the civil service.
A more specific  question:  whether the Bank's policy-based  lending to Kenya
in the 1980s has allowed Kenya to undertake  adjustment  or postpone it. Here too, the
answer is mixed. The most successful  area of reform has been trade liberalization
(and exchange  rate depreciation)-and to a lesser extent export development.  The link
between trade reform and the increased  demand for foreign  exchange that it generates
(at a given exchange  rate) is quite direct, and it would be right to conclude  that the
reforms would not have occurred had the Bank not kept up steady lending. At the
same time, it is arguable that the budget support  provided by these funds helped
postpone many critical reforms-the  civil service, parastatal  divestiture  (including  the
National Cereals and Produce  Board), and the social sectors.
58POSTSCRIPT
Improvements in Stabilization and Structural Reform Policies in 1993
The text of this paper covers the period  to the end of 1992,  by which  time macro-economic
imbalances had become extremely severe and banking irregularities rampant.  Earlier, in
November  1991, bilateral  donors had suspended  new comnmitments  of fast disbursing  assistance,
citing  poor governance  and economic  mismanagement.  In September  1992,  because  of continuing
deterioration  in macroeconomic  and sectoral  policies,  the Bank  decided  to postpone  disbursements
of the second tranches of ongoing operations, and in December 1992, cancelled the second
tranche of  the second agricultural sector loan because of  the reimposition of  movement
restrictions  on maize.  This strained  the relationship  between  the government  and the donors and
multilateral  institutions. This section  of the paper briefly summarizes  the developments  in 1993,
and describes the turn-around  that appears to have occurred, both in the pace of economic
reforms and country relations.
The areas  of primary  concern  in 1992--the  monetary,  financial  and external  sectors--continued
to be difficult  during early 1993. Expansionary  monetary  policies  --which allowed  weak  financial
institutions  to borrow heavily from the central  bank -- further exacerbated  inflation  and created
a widening spread between the market-determined  inter-bank exchange rate and the official
exchange rate.  Negative real interest rates, excess liquidity in the banking system and the
continuing impasse between the Government and multilateral financial institutions led to
intensified  speculation  against  the Kenya shilling. Instead  of tightening  its monetary and fiscal
stance, the Government  announced, on March 22,  1993, its intention  to reverse previously
adopted  liberalization  measures,  in effect  to abandon  the adjustment  program. Retention  accounts
were no longer  allowed  and all export earnings  were to be remitted  to the Central Bank of Kenya
(CBK)  at the official  rate. The Government  also indicated  that it would reimpose  price controls,
although  this did not occur.
Throughout  this period, IDA continued  to withhold  the second tranches for the on-going
operations.  The Government soon recognized that while reimposed restrictions might
temporarily relieve the  shortage of  foreign exchange, macroeconomic imbalances were
aggravating inflation, weakening the  Kenya shilling and  most importantly, were further
undermining  confidence  in Kenya's economic  management. During April-May 1993  therefore,
under a shadow-program  with the IMF, the Government  adopted  measures  aimed at tightening
monetary  and financial  sector  policies.  They included:  (a) open  market operations  to aggressively
raise nominal  interest rates  on treasury  bills; (b) increasing  the cash ratio from 6 to 8 percent and
stiffening substantially  the penalties for noncompliance;  (c) closing the export pre-shipment
discount  facility  (one of the causes of excess liquidity);  and (d) placing two bank with seriously
impaired  portfolios  under statutory  management  and putting  eight non-bank  financial  institutions
in the hands of liquidators.
The Government  also took initial steps to strengthen  and enforce prudential  regulations in
o-der to prevent a recurrence  of  monetary  mismanagement.  Special  audits  were commissioned
for selected financial institutions  to determine their financial condition and soundness, with
59particular emphasis  on portfolio quality; these will form the basis for further remedial actions.
In addition, most exemptions  from prudential  regulations  granted by the previous Minister of
Finance,  were revoked. The institutions  in receipt  of these  exemptions  were given  approximately
one month  to comply  with all regulations  from which they were exempted.
There was renewed  effort to strengthen  external sector policies.  Several devaluations
brought the official  rate to within 10 percent  of the market-determined  interbank  rate.  The May
14 devaluation  was accompanied  by  the abolition  of import licenses  for all but a small negative
list of commodities,  and the reintroduction  of 50 percent retention  of all export earnings  (which
must be used, however, or sold within 90 days).  Separately,  the Government  stepped up its
efforts to enhance fiscal  performance,  partly by freezing  all unnecessary  non-wage  expenditures
until the end of the FY93. Greater attention  was also being  paid to recovering  uncollected  taxes
and debt service payments  from parastatals.
On the  basis of these actions,  IDA released  the second  tranche  of the export  development
credit.  Later in May, the Government  agreed on a formal IMF-monitored  macroeconomic
program for the remainder of 1993. However, following  release of the second tranche of the
export development  credit, major irregularities  in foreign exchange  and interbank transactions
began to undermine  the macroeconomic  program  and weaken  discipline  in the financial sector.
After  another round of  consultations with the multilateral institutions,  the Government
implemented  additional measures intended to  further tighten monetary and financial sec.or
policies, including: (a) raising further the cash ratio for banks in two steps to  12 percent; (b)
abolishing  the Clearing  House arrangements  which allowed  commercial  banks to run overdrafts
with CBK; and (c) reversing  a series of illegal transactions  between  CBK  and four commercial
banks, and revoking the licenses of three of the four banks implicated in the transactions.
Separately,  the license of another bank, which failed to meet prudential  regulations, was also
revoked.  In addition, senior managers of the Central Bank, including the Governor, were
replaced. Section 53 of the Banking Act was formally amended to eliminate most of the
discretionary  exemptions  from prudential  regulations  and all exemptions  not consistent  with the
amendment  were revoked.
The tightening of  monetary and  financial sector policies helped to  reverse the rapid
depreciation  of the Kenya shilling, infact the market rate appreciated  . This paved the way for
the unification  of the official  and market  exchange  rates  on October 17, 1993. Arrears on private
trade credit were cleared while  arrears on public and public guaranteed  debt began to decline.
The tighter monetary  stance  also contributed  to the reduction  in inflation  from around 100  percent
(annualized  rate) in the second quarter of 1993 to 55 percent in the third quarter.  With this
reduction in inflation,  nominal short-term  interest rates on Treasury  bills have begun to decline
but they remain positive in real terms. On the fiscal front, the June 1993 budget featured
signigicant  expenditure  compression  and rationalization  of the tariff and VAT structures. When
it appeared that budgetary targets were being threatened by higher than anticipated  interest
payments ( to the tune of 2.7% of GDP), and a higher  than budgeted  subsidy  to the NCPB, the
Governmnent  agreed to additional  revenue  and expenditure  control measures.
Further, all restrictions were removed on the importation  of maize and on the domestic
movement  of imported  maize, traders were once again allowed  to move domestically  produced
maize in loads of up to eighty-eight  90 kilogram bags. A comprehensive  civil service reform
60program, involving  the retrenchment  of civil servants in lower grades and provision  of a safety
net for tnese  retrenched  workers, was  launched  officially. The Government  also replaced  the top
management  of the Kenya Posts and Telecommunications  Corporation  which is performing
poorly and contributing  to the fiscal  deficit.
These improvements  in the policy  environment  facilitated  the successful  negotiation  of a PFP
and a  one-year  ESAF arrangement  with the IMF.  Following  this agreement,  the Consultative
Group of donors on Kenya also met on  November 22 and 23,  1993 and  indicated new
commitments  for 1994 totalling $850 million, of which $170 million is in the form of quick-
disbursing  balance of payments  support.  However, donois emphasized  that the translation  of
these commitments  into disbursements  depended  on the timely and decisive implementation  by
the Government  of the economic  reform agenda  presented  in the PFP. Separately,  on December
3, 1993, IDA released the second tranche of EDSAC after the final condition--involving  the
compliance  of a particular  commercial  bank with Kenya's  Banking  Act and prudential  regulations-
-was met.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully evaluate  these  policy changes  in full. It appears
that  little has changed  in the structure  of the expenditures. Interest payments  are rising, and
subsidies  to the NCPB remain  high. The problem  of inadequate  non-wage  expenditures  remains.
The retrenchmnent  program is a good begining,  but is unlikely  to create savings  in the short run;
infact the retrenchment  fund may well increase expenditures. The greatest success  has been in
the area of enforcing  banking  and prudential  regulations  and removing  the worst  offenders  -- both
in terms if institutions and personalities. Trade and foreign exchange markets appear to be
essentially  free; indeed in these areas, reforms  are much  further along  than before the crisis. On
grain marketing , the situtaion has not advanced  much beyond what it was  before the crisis,
which as indicated  in the text of the paper,  was not satisfactory.
Perhaps the most important  outcome was in terms of effective  country assistance  strategy.
Donors and multilateral  instutions  held firm , for the first time perhaps.  As a result, economic
mismanagement  and poor  governance were put clearly on  the agenda.  In addition, the
Government and the multilateral institutions  learnt the value of consistency and clarity  in
dialogue over very difficult policy issues. It is too early to judge the sustainablility  of the
outcome,  but the developments  deserve careful  evaluation.
61FOOTNOTES
1. The million  acre settlement  scheme introduced  in 1961  and other minor settlement
schemes settled over 34,000 families  on 430,000 hectares. The Shirika program
started in 1971 had settled more than 100,000  hectares by 1976. Altogether,  about
one-third of the large-scale mixed  farm area was officially  subdivided.
2. Coffee and tea farmers received  about 90 percent of the world market prices on
average. However, small coffee farmers received lower prices essentially  because of
deductions  made by inefficient  cooperatives.  The price paid for maize has been about
75 percent of the import parity price in the eighties  but well above the export parity
price. Here too, late payments  by the Cereal Marketing  Board has caused delays in
some years.
3. In the agricultural  sector where attempts  at budget rationalization  have been most
persistent, initially, the ministry of agriculture  excluded  about 10 percent of its
projects which it judged as having lower priority while the ministry of livestock
development  discarded  about 20 percent of its projects. A subset  of 33 was then
defined as "core projects" for priority full funding  in 1991-92. However, actual
allocations  were substantially  lower, i.e. 56 percent of the developmeAlt  budget as
compared to 69 percent. On recurrent expenditures,  there was a decrease of 6 percent
compared to a targeted increase  of 4.4 percent. Tronically,  non-core projects fared
better.
4. In FY92, a large number of discretionary  measures  were introduced  to bring the
deficit under control. These included  extension  of excise duties to an additional  range
of goods, a minimum  import duty of 2 percent on many previously duty free items
and the elimination  of import duty exemptions.
5. The average lag from license application  to allocation  fell from six months in 1988
to about four weeks in early 1991. But soon, the time taken lengthened  to more than
ten weeks; importers reacted by subrnitting  multiple  applications,  whereby the
government  returned all applications  for resubmissions.
6. Among non-traditional  exports, the rapid growth of horticultural  exports preceded
even the import liberalization  program begun in 1988. Between 1981-88, the volume
of horticultural  exports grew more than sixfold,  and by 1991 more than sevenfold.  As
a private sector initiative,  this subsector  is able to prosper essentially  because of
minimal regulation  by the horticultural  crops development  authority, a parastatal that
has concentrated  on promotional  efforts rather than actual involvement  in marketing.
7. The Hirschmann  index, which measures  concentration  on a scale of 0 to 1
(maximum  concentration)  was estimated  for the bank and near bank sectors for
end-1991. This statistic  indicated  that the strength of competition  in the industry was
similar to that in a market characterized  by about five equal sized banks rather than
the twenty-eight that actually  exist. For the near bank financial  intermediaries,  it was
as if there were thirteen  equal sized institutions  rather than the fifty-six that actually
exist.
6 28. For example, during 1991, six to ten banks had liquidity ratios below the
minimum,  and as many as twenty-four  to twenty-nine near bank financial
intermediaries  did not meet the requirements.
9. An examination  of the annual ratios shows that after reaching a low of 19 percent
in 1985, it increased slightly to an ave'age of 20.3 percent during 1986-90, before
aeclining to 17.3 percent in 1991.  4
10. It is more difficult to explain why the ratio of manufactured  exports to output has
fallen, despite a growth twice that of output. Again, an examination  of annual ratios
shows that after falling  to a low of 5 percent in 1987, the ratio increased to 7.5
percent in 1991.
63Table I  The composition  of current
expenditures. 1981,  1985,  and 1990
(percent  of  GDP)
Economnic  clossification
(current  expenditures)  1981  1985  1990
Wages  and  salares  6.0  6.1  6.0
Teacher,'  salaries  2.8  3,2  3.9
Total  8.8  9.3  9.9
Nonwage  expenditures  8.5  6.7  6.3
Defense  related  2.8  2.1  2.6
Nondefense  related  5.7  4.6  3.7
Interest  2.4  4.1  5.4
Dornestc  1.3  2.6  3.6
Foreign  1.1  1.6  1.8




Education  6.1  5.5  6,4
Health  2.3  1,7  1.7
Not  available.
SoLuce:  Statistical  Abstracts,  Economic  Surveys  (various  ;ssues),  IMF,  and
World  Bank  stalf  estin es.
Table  2  Financing  of budget deficits,
1981-91
(change  in ratio)
Item  1981-84  I  984-91
Budget  deficit/GDP
(excluding  grants)  -5.8  +4.5
Financing
Grants/GDP  -0.1  + 1.2
Foreign  borrowing/GDP  -4.7  + 1.7
Domestic  financing/GDP  -1  .0  + 1.5
Inflation  (change  in rate)&  -II. I  +4.7
Growth  of real  domestic  credit
(annual  percentage)  3,4  5.6
Change  in share  of  prvate sector
in total  credit  -6.3  -2.8
a.  From  December  to  December.
Source:  Statistical  Abstracts,  Ecnomic  Surveys  (various  Is  -es), IMF,  and
World  Bank  staff  estimates
64Table  3  Key  incentive  Indicators,  1982-92
(Percentages  and indices,  1982  -=  100)
Indicators  : 982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992
Exterryll sector
Effective  exchange  rates,
Nominal  100.0  97.4  82.9  73.6  69.3  55.1
Real  100.0  101.9  87.1  72.5  61.8  60.9
Terms of tade  100.0  109.9  103.4  88.4  71.0
Average  import tariffs (percent)
Unweighted  0.0  4  1.0  38.8  41.3  38.8
Import-weighted"  0.0  0.0  24.3  27.3  22.0
Domestic  Economy
Real  Wages,
Private  sector  100.0  83.8  83.9  89.0  83.7
Public  sector  100.0  85.3  87.5  88.3  77.8
Inflation  (annual  percent)'  22.2  9.0  5.6  12.3  15.8  27.3
Real  interest  rates  (annual  percent)
Deposits  10.0  2.7  5.6  2.0  -2.1  -10.1
Loans  7.7  5.3  8.4  2.7  3.0  -6.6
Not availabie.
a. IMF  index.
b. Weighted  by 1989/80  import  values;  estimates  are  for fiscal  years  (e.g. 1987  refers  to 1987/88).
c. Upper-ends  of average  commercial  bank  3 to 6 months  deposits  and unsecured  loans  and deposits.
d. Revised  Nairobi  consumer  price  index  since  1987.
Source  Statistical  Abstracts,  Economic  Surveys  (various  issues),  IMF,  and  World B.nk  staff  estimates.
Table  4  Annual  lkense  requirements  and  costs
Item  Overall  Small  Medium  Late
Number,  regular  4.5  (1.3)  2.9  (0.6)  4.0  (0.5)  9.7  (1.3)
Number,  specific  (import/export)  10.2  (3.4)  1.2  (3.4)  3.8  (2.3)  38.9  (1.7)
Total  15.1  (2.4)  4.3  (1.2)  8.0  (1.2)  49.0  (1.4)
Full  cost  (thousands  KSh)  124.3  (3.1)  16.1  (3.7)  95.0  (2.8)  450.4  (1.6)
Transaction  cost(work  hours)  223.0  (14.8)  69.0  (1.7)  89.7  (1.7)  816.0  (2.8)
Full  cost/sales  (percent)  5.2  (3.0)  9,4  (2.3)  1.8  (1.7)  1.2  (2.6)
Licensemarkupa(percent)  66.0  (4.9)  30.5  (2.1)  102.3  (S.1)  84.6  (2.1)
Note:  The  left  entry  in each  cell  is  the mean  value. The  coefficient  o variation  is  provided  in parentheses.  Mean  values  reported  in the table  are
statistically  significant  at  the 05 level  uniess  othervwise  noted
a Defined  as  full  cost/direct  cost I
Source:  Worid Bank/GTZ  firm level  survey,  1992.
65Table 5  Producer  prices  in Kenya
(percentoge  of inpor/export  pariry)
Product  1  984-6  1  99  -92
Maize
Percent  of import panty  73.2'  69.9
Percent  of export parity  1  55,7  28.8
Coffeeb  (percent of export price)  9  1.3  89.5
Teab  (percent of export prices)  84.4  88.6
a  Figure  for 1  983,  since  there  were no  exports  in  984
b. These  are  average  prices.  Small  holders  obtained  about  80 percert  of
the price  obtained  by  estates,  because  of differences  in quality,  and,  in
the -wse  of coffee  growers,  deductions  by  the  co-operatives
Source  World Bank  data  and estimates  by  Gurushri  Swamy
Table  6  National  cereals  and  produce  board
operations
Item  1983-84  1991-92
Producer  price of maize (KSh/ton)  144  300
Price  to millers (KShAton)  208  3  59
Gross margin/producer
price (percent)  53.5  19.7
Natonal cereals  and produce
board deficits  (K£:  millions)'  12.8  70.9
Deficit/current govemment
expenditures  I .3  2.3
Deficit per ton handled
(KL per ton)  1  1.4  74.3
a. Before  finance  charges
b. Sales  and  purchases
Source:  World Bank  and Egerton  University  data,  Proxeedings  of
Conference  on Maize  Supply  and Morketing,  June  1  99,  and estimates  by
Gurushri  Swamy
66Table 7  Performance  indicators  of the parastatal sector
Efficiency  indicators  1986-91
Total value added (annual  percent)  0.5
Value added in manufacturing  (annual  percent)  -0.1
Change in total factor productivity/  (annual  percent)  -1.7
Growth rate of labor use/growth rate of labor in pnvate sector (ratio)  0.6
Growth rate of capital  inpuits/grovvth  rate of canital  In pnvate sector (ratio)  2.1
Relationship  to budget  and external  accounts  1986-91
Net lending and equity to parastatals/overall  net lending by government (percent)  35.4
Profits, interest and dividend payments/tax  revenue  3.7
Parastatal  extemal debt/public and publicly  guaranteed  debt (I 990) (percent)  17.0
Parastatal  extemal debt servicing/total  (I 990) (percent)  25.5
Net exports of parastatals/total  net exports (percent)  -27.9
Relationship  to bonking  system  and near  bank  financiol  intermediaries  1986-91
Parastatal  depositsAotal  commercial bank deposits  6.7
Parastatal  deposits/total near bank financial  intermediaries  deposits  10.0
Parastatal  credit/commercial bank credit  6.0
Parastatal  credit/near bank financial  intermediaries  credit  1.3
Source:  Worid Bank  data
Tabl.  8  The effects  on intermediate variables
Crisis  period  The  adjustment  period
Intermediate  vanable  (1976-81)  Phase  I  1(981-84)  Phase  I/  (1985-91)
Change in fiscal  deficit/GDP (percentage  points)  5.7  -5.8  4.5
Inflation  rate, (change  in rate)  3.3  -1  1.1  4.7
Real  average  interest rate (loans)  2.1  -0.3  4.6
Real  effective  exchange  rate (percentage  change)  16.9  5.7  -42.3
Change in current account/GDP (percentage  points)  9.9  -8.2  4 .0b
Debt service/exports  average  (percent)  8.0  26.0-28.0  30.0
Note:  A minus  indicates  a  decline  in deficit  or rate
a  December  to December
b. 1984-90.
Source:  Statistical  Abstracts,  Economic  Surveys  (various  issues),  IMF,  and  World Bank  staff  estimates.
67Table 9  Macroeconomic  and sectoral  outcomes, 1975-80, 1980 84, and 1985-91
Cnsis  period  Pie  o  }cdJustm  ent period__  _
Item  19/5-80  Phose  I(  (1980--84)  Phase  11  (I1985-91)
GDP grovvth (annual  percent)  5.6  2.1I  5.0
Gross investment/GDP  28.8'  23.8  20.0
Incremental capital  output ratio (year averages)'  ..  10.8  4.2
Total factor grovvth/procluctivity  (annual  percent)  .. 0.3  1  .9'
Sectoral  GDP  Growth  (annual  percent)
AgTiculture  2.6  2,8  3.5
Industry  .. 2.1  5.0
Manufacturing  7.6  3.7  5.3
Services  4.1  5.1
External tradSe
Export growth  (annual  percent)  0.5  -3.4  4.8
Grovvth of volume of manufacturing  exports
(annual  percent)  .4.1  -8.7  10.5'
Nonoil imports/GDPr  22.5  18.0  19.1
Domestic expor-ts/GDP  20.6  16.6  1  3.4
Manufacturing  imports/domestic supply  44.3d  26.8  19.1
Manufacturing  exports/outpuxt  22.61  1  3.3  6.1
Savintgs  and investrnent  (percent  of GDP)
Fixed  investmnent  23.2'  21.6  19.4
Public  10.41  8.8  8.1
;Private  12.6'  12.8  1  1.3
Financing
Central govemment savings  2.8'  -1I.  I  -1 .5
Private  sector savingS  1  8.2'  20.2  21.9
Foreign savings  (grants and net borrovving)y  9.0  1.4  4.6
..  Not availbbkl.
a.  1977-79.
b, Average  of incrernental  caprtal  output  rabos  for 1980-84,  and 1  985-90
c. 1985-90.
c.l 1972.
e. Shares  base  on 1979  data
f The  data  are  averaged  differently  to sharpen  the changes,  the firsn  period  refers  to 1978-8  1, the  second  to 1  982-86,  and the last  to 1  987-9  1.
Source  Stbstiical  Abstracts,  Economic  Surveys  (various Issues),  IMlF,  and World  Bank staff estimates
6 8Box I
KENYA: Initial Distortions and Proeress on Polik, Reforms
poEkv  Area  Inital  Siuation  Reformu  Assessment of Prosress
Policy  In early eighties, financial  imbalances  Sharp deflation during 1980-84,  Reversal of deflationary  trend
Management  and inflation  high.  Budget  deficit  9% of  through reduction  of budget deficit  during 1985-91. Financial
GDP, current account  balWc  t2.5% of  (4%). import compresion, tigt  imbalance  increased  to lvels of
GDP, grss  invcstnent - 30% of CDP,  monetary  policy and  decUlne  in public  early eighties.
financed  half by foreign savings. Large  investment.
expansion in public investnrent  in 70?.  Budgct Radonalization
Budget Rationalition  Program  unsuccessful,  proportion  of
inkoduced in 1985  to increase O5rM  funding for O&M fUll rom  36%
expenditumes  and prioritize investerst  in FYSI to 26% in FY86 and
e: tit  tf;00  i  txpenditures.  0  i22%  in FY91.
ionetar7 Policy  ioaly  eightics,  banking  system  ilower jrwo  in credit durg  '  Reversl  of treds  in monctary
financed  large budget deficits,  direct  stabilization  period, 198044, positive  growth; continued  decline in share
controls on crodit to private sector,  interst rates, but continued  controls  of private sector credit (by 2.8
negatdve  interest ratns.  on private sector credit whose shar  percentage  points),
declined  by 63 percentage  points.
Attempt to shif to indireat  instruments  Shift to indirect instrument not
of monetary  control, starting  in 1989 - successful; auction market limited,
i.e. introduction  of auction for  direct credit controls and
government  paper, activation  of  placement  of government
reserve and liquidity ratios.  securties  continue  to be main
instrurnents.
Higher interest rates contributed
to increased  domestic  debt service
payment as  share  of GDP, from
1.3%  in FYS1 to 3.6% in FY90.
3. Exchange  Rate  Tied to the USS during 1971-75  and to  Active management  of exchange  rate  Except for 1980-S4  when the rel
Managcment  SDR  since then, discrete  devaluations  through mucb of eighties. In 1992,  exchange rate appreciated,  there
had depreciated  real exchange  rate  tradeable foreign  exchange  certificates  has been real depreciation  during
during 70s.  and export retention  schemes  1985-91,  compensating  more than
introduced.  fuUy  for temu of trade changes
and domestic inflation. The
black-market  premium  declined.
A second legal free market  for
foreign  exchange  is functioning.
In 1992, however, the official rate
appreciated,  and the legal parallel
markets carried premiums  of 30-
50%.
6934. Import Liberalizaion  Hi"hly protected  by QRs and high tariffs  First attempt  during 1980-84  to  First attempt unsuccessful,
and bans.  Break-up  of EAC in 1971  remove QRs and reduce tariffs.  Import libe.alization  became
intenuifsed  inuard-orientation.  Second attempt from 1988-92  to  hostage to stabilization  needs.
remove QRa and reduce tariffs.
Second attempt  relatively
successful. By July 1991, only
items protected  by QRs were foq
health or public safety, aU other
items were licensed
.automatically'.
Average import weighted  taiff
rcduced from 30% in 1984185  to
20% in 1991/92. Tariffs on
competing  imports fell faster.
In practice, even for items ceUible
for automatic  licensing,  permits
are delayed  and foreign  exchange
authorizations  have to be
obtained. This applies as well to
imports financed  with own funds
Nevertheless,  the import/GDP
ratio increased slightly,
4A. Export Promotiou of  ArAexport bias despite export-  Introduction  of MUB Schema (1988),  MUB and import dutyNAT
Non-Traditional  Goods  compensation  scheme which functioned  and import dutyNAT exemption  schemes  are popular, but too ear
poorly.  schbem (1990), Export Processing  to assess impact.
Zone (to be completed  in 1993).
Manufactured  export growth has
picked up, 10% p.a. increase
during 1985-91,  mainly
attributable  to inport liberalization
and exchange  rate depreciation.
5. Liberalization  of  Agricultural  output and input, pricing  Prices for most manufactures  Relaxation  of food marketing
Domestic Prices and  not distortionary,  but maize trade  decontrolled,  and for many staple  controls has not resulted in true
Trade  controled by parastatal and movemnent  foods, except maize and wheat.  Some  liberalization  - the parastatal
controls. Retail prices controled for  relaxation  of grain movement controls  rmrnains  the major actor.
basic commodities.  and controls  on direct sales to millers.  Recently, movement  controls  were
reimposed.
Manufactured  goods prices controlled,
and parastatal  control on wholesale  trade  Wholesale  trade in some
in a number of goods.  manufactures  continues to be
controled by parastatal (Kenya
National  Trading Corporation, for
example).
6. Fmancial Sector  Large number of banks and NBFls, but  Amendment  of Banking Law to  Pocr implementation  leading  to a
concentration  and segmentaion high,  improve licensing and regulations,  financial sector crisis in ate
Poor licensing  and regulatory  rwcagthening  of central bank's  eighties. N' .,oer of distressed
framework leading to financial  distress.  technical and managerial  capacity.  institutior  jcreased,
Critical unhealthy  cross-relationship  with  Restructuring  of 9 small instituions.  restructuring  unsuccessful.
parastatals.  Excessive  poLitical  interference
and continued  link to parstatals.
70Public Enterpri  Large paustatal sector (about 250  None  None
efora  enterprises)  accouAting  for 11% of
CDP, ovenrhelningly  in manufacturing.
Economic inefficiency,  monopoly  status,
and  budgetary  dniins characterize  sector.
8. Labor and Wage  Labor policies towards private sector  None  None
Policies  flexible and  pragmatic  despite extensive
unionization,  coUective  agreetncts.
Only significant  restric'ion is on
permanent  retrenchment.  Public  ector
eaployment  % of labor force, grew
by 10% p.s. during the 70s,  mainly  at
the  lower grdes.  Guaranteed
employment  for university  and training
programi  graduates.
Social Sector Policie  High private and  government  spending  Reforms  since  1991, attempt  at  The Government  has maintained
(6% of GDP}  on education. By early  limiting  the growth of teaching force,  its expenditures  (as a share  of
SOs,  pimary  school  enrollment  increasing  class size and increase cost  GDP) and  has  not discriminated
universal. But public expenditures  recovery  at the university  level,  against sector.  But has  not been
biased toward secondary levels  and  able  to retratin growib of teaching
teachers' salaries. Low internal  force.  Cost recovery has
efficiency.  increased.
Good health indicators - some  of the  In 1989,  grduated  user  charges  were  The program of user  fees  was
best  among low income  countries. But  introduced  for certain services  and  poorly implemented,  some
tertiary care and large urban hospitals  taenities,  facilities  were allowed to  features  abandoned, others
take  up disproportionate  sbare of  keep 75  % of coliection, and waivers  reintroduced. Impact unclear.
resources,  with poor coat recovery,  were aSlowed  for those unable to pay.
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